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ANY of the Supreme Court’s most significant decisions turn 
on questions of fact. These facts are not of the “whodunit” 
variety concerning what happened between the parties. They are 
instead more generalized facts about the world: Is a partial-birth 
abortion ever medically necessary?1 Can one effectively discharge a 
M 
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locked gun in self-defense?2 Are African American children stig-
matized by segregated schools?3
Questions like these are not legal—they do not involve the in-
terpretation of a text, nor do they involve a choice between com-
peting rules that proscribe conduct.4 But they are also not “facts of 
the case” in the way we generally use that phrase—the who / what / 
where / why questions that should ultimately go to a jury or fact 
finder. Instead, these questions implicate what have come to be 
known as “legislative facts.”5 A legislative fact gets its name not 
necessarily because it is found by a legislature, but because it re-
lates to the “legislative function” or policy-making function of a 
court.6 The central feature of a legislative fact is that it “tran-
2 District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2818 (2008). 
3 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 733 (2007); 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954). 
4 I disclaim any attempt to define with precision the line between law and fact. To 
be sure, there are those who say it is impossible to do. John McGinnis & Charles Mu-
laney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 71 (2008) (“There is no ana-
lytic dichotomy between law and fact.”). That difficult inquiry, however, lies outside 
the scope of this Article. I do note that even if the law-fact division line is fuzzy, it is 
still a line we expect courts to draw and one with which we often wrestle. See, e.g., 
John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 477, 489–93 (1986) (identifying 
the division between law and fact and discussing the similarities each has with social 
science research). 
5 “Legislative fact” and “adjudicative fact” are phrases coined by Kenneth Culp 
Davis in 1942 to distinguish types of fact finding in administrative agencies. See Ken-
neth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Pro-
cedures, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 364, 365–66 (1942). More recently, scholars have refined 
and further categorized legislative facts—perhaps most notably David Faigman, who 
has classified what he calls “constitutional facts” into several categories depending on 
the purpose for which the fact is used. See David Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A 
Unified Theory of Constitutional Facts, at xiii (2008); see also John McGinnis & 
Charles Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const. Comment. 69, 70 (2008) (dis-
cussing confusion surrounding what they call “social facts”); Suzanna Sherry, Founda-
tional Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 145, 146 (2011) (discussing a 
form of legislative facts she calls “foundational facts” because they consist of the fac-
tual assumptions on which legal doctrine is based). All still pay homage, however, to 
Davis’s original articulation of the distinction, and it is therefore his terminology on 
which I will primarily rely. See Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional 
Litigation, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 75, 77 n.9 (explaining that “the phrase virtually belongs 
to Professor Kenneth C. Davis” (citing Kenneth C. Davis, Administrative Law Trea-
tise § 15.03 (1958))). 
6 Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-
Making Process, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 157, 191 (2004) (stating that legislative facts are 
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scend[s] the particular dispute,”7 and provides descriptive informa-
tion about the world which judges use as foundational “building 
blocks” to form and apply legal rules.8
To take a controversial example, when the Supreme Court up-
held the federal partial-birth abortion statute in 2007, Justice Ken-
nedy relied in part on the factual assertion (one he said could not 
be measured by reliable data but which “seemed unexception-
able”) that many women come to regret their abortions later in 
their lives.9 Justice Kennedy was not speaking about the specific 
plaintiff in that case, but on the emotional consequences of abor-
tions generally—a statement of legislative fact.10
So where do the Justices find information that enables them to 
decide factual questions about the world? The typical answer in-
volves trust in the adversarial system. The basic idea is that “the 
adversary system is . . . quite practiced at finding facts.”11 If a fact is 
important to a case’s resolution, then the parties (and their amici)12 
can provide the Court with enough information to address it 
through testimony (at the trial level) and briefing (on appeal). And 
if one party presents unreliable or flawed evidence to support his 
relevant when “the court is in essence ‘making law’ either by filling a gap in the com-
mon law by formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional rule”). 
7 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Em-
pirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 552 
(1991). 
8 Robert E. Keeton, Legislative Facts and Similar Things: Deciding Disputed Prem-
ise Facts, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 11 (1988); see also Sherry, supra note 5. 
9 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to 
measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come 
to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
10 See Stuart M. Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269, 273 (2000) (“Judicial opinions 
are filled with assertions about the state of the world . . . .”); Brianne J. Gorod, The 
Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record Factfinding, 61 Duke L.J. 1, 52 
(2011) (“[L]egislative facts often are—and have been—critical to court decisions.”). 
11 Wendy M. Rogovin, The Politics of Facts: “The Illusion of Certainty,” 46 Hastings 
L.J. 1723, 1758 (1995); see also Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 Duke L.J. 
447, 449 (2009) (noting the “entrenched norm . . . of party presentation”); Elizabeth 
G. Thornburg, The Curious Appellate Judge: Ethical Limits on Independent Re-
search, 28 Rev. Litig. 131, 185 (2008). 
12 I assume in this Article that a party’s amici count as part of the adversarial proc-
ess. For discussion of the reasons behind that assumption, see infra note 74 and ac-
companying text. 
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factual claim, then we can count on the other party to point this 
out.13
The idea, however, that courts depend only on the adversary sys-
tem to inform their decisions—even for fact finding—is “more 
myth than reality.”14 As others have recently observed, judges 
“reach beyond the four corners of the parties’ briefing” when they 
think the parties have not done enough.15 With respect to questions 
of legislative fact, this happens because the importance of the fact 
did not become apparent until after the case was pending on ap-
peal, or perhaps because the parties do not brief it in enough detail 
to convince a judge or Justice that he knows all he needs (or wants) 
to know.16
Traditionally, the options facing a judge who wants extra-record 
information about a legislative fact were limited.17 This is not due 
to any procedural bar to independent research.18 Unlike with adju-
13 McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 5, at 71 (“[The judiciary’s] salient institutional 
structure is the adversarial proceeding where each side has incentives to scrutinize re-
lentlessly the factual claims of its opponent.”). 
14 Gorod, supra note 10, at 3. 
15 Frost, supra note 11, at 453; see also Gorod, supra note 10, at 4; Frederick 
Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 267, 285 (2001). 
16 Legislative facts are not new by any means, but several commentators have re-
marked that their centrality to the Supreme Court’s decisions is on the rise along with 
perhaps an increased pressure the Court feels to pepper its opinions with empirical 
support. Faigman, supra note 7, at 550 (“Increasingly, commentators and litigants are 
checking the modern Court’s fact-finding on the basis of empirical research that only 
sometimes supports, and often contradicts, the Court’s ‘best guesses’ about the 
world.”); Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-Neutral Principles and 
Constitutional Truths, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 115, 118 (2003) (describing and critiquing the 
increased use of empirical methods and data to decide constitutional cases); see also 
A. Christopher Bryant, The Empirical Judiciary, 25 Const. Comment. 467, 468 (2008); 
Gorod, supra note 10, at 28–33 (discussing the role of legislative facts in Citizens 
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010), and Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 
(2007)). 
17 Kenneth Culp Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A 
Proposed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 7 (1986) 
(“[Courts] always have the needed adjudicative facts, that is, the facts about the im-
mediate parties—who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive or intent. 
But courts often have inadequate legislative facts, that is, the facts that bear on the 
court’s choices about law and policy.”). 
18 Bryant, supra note 16, at 472 (“[W]hile the controversy surrounding judicial de-
termination of legislative facts in constitutional cases is an ancient one, the legal pro-
fession’s understanding of it remains inadequate.”); Edward K. Cheng, Independent 
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dicative facts, courts are free to approach legislative fact questions 
without the use of experts or witness testimony, and can even go 
outside the bounds of the record.19 There is currently no federal law 
restricting outside evidence of this sort. Indeed, the rule of evi-
dence concerning judicial notice of facts—which would seem the 
chief candidate for providing uniform guidelines on this question—
specifically exempts legislative facts from its scope.20
Until recently, however, courts still faced a real institutional dis-
advantage at gathering information about the world by themselves. 
Unlike a legislative body, courts (even the Supreme Court) deal 
with legislative facts without a specialized staff, without an army of 
lobbyists happy to provide statistics and data to support their 
causes, and without the ability to subpoena those who may have 
the information they need to evaluate the question at hand. These 
institutional weaknesses are well recognized by scholars and mem-
bers of the judiciary.21
Judicial Research in the Daubert Age, 56 Duke L.J. 1263, 1290 (2007) (“Judicial no-
tice of legislative facts . . . is basically unregulated.”). 
19 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law Treatise § 10.5 (2002) (“The judicial 
practice of using extra record facts for deciding questions of law and policy is deeply 
established. It has been accepted by the legal profession without challenge.”); Keeton, 
supra note 8, at 14 (arguing that the rules for gathering adjudicative facts are largely 
ignored with respect to legislative facts). This lack of regulation has led one promi-
nent commentator to describe the law governing legislative facts as “chaotic.” Faig-
man, supra note 5, at xii (“[C]onstitutional facts come to the Court’s attention hap-
hazardly.”); id. at 98. 
20 See Fed. R. Evid. 201(c), (e); see also id. advisory committee’s note. 
21 Davis, supra note 17, at 5–6, 14; id. at 8 (“[T]he Court may often be at its worst on 
policy issues that are dependent upon understanding or instincts about legislative 
facts.”); see also Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial 
Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 Duke L.J. 1169, 1179–81 (2000) (discussing the 
well-noted weaknesses of the judiciary as to fact finding, although challenging the as-
sumption that Congress will be superior in all instances); Phillip B. Kurland, Toward a 
Political Supreme Court, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 19, 38 (1969) (“[T]he Court . . . lacks ma-
chinery for gathering the wide range of facts and opinions that should inform the 
judgment of a prime policymaker.”). 
 The Justices themselves seem well aware of the weakness. In Furman v. Georgia, 
for example, Justice Blackmun’s dissenting opinion specifically asserted that the “case 
against capital punishment . . . rests primarily on factual claims, the truth of which 
cannot be tested by conventional judicial processes.” 408 U.S. 238, 405 (1972) 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Souter provides a more recent example of this judi-
cial candor. In his concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg, Souter doubted the 
Court’s ability to evaluate the factual claim that euthanasia would lead to coerced sui-
cide. 521 U.S. 702, 786–87 (1997). 
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The classic resort, then, for a reviewing judge who wants more 
information on a legislative fact is to one of several less than ideal 
options. She can send the case back to the trial court to take evi-
dence on the question of fact; she can simply assert an emphatic 
view of the fact with nothing to support the view except for “com-
mon experience”; or she can engage in extra-record research 
searching for an authority to support the facts she needs to bolster 
her argument.22
It is this last option that is the focus of this Article. Independent 
judicial research of legislative facts is certainly not a new phe-
nomenon. We have all heard the stories of Justice Blackmun holed 
up in the medical library at the Mayo Clinic during the summer of 
1972 studying abortion procedures.23 But since that time the world 
has undergone a massive change in the way it obtains information. 
The digital revolution provides a new tool for members of the judi-
ciary to address legislative facts. 
The U.S. Supreme Court provides an accessible and instructive 
example.24 Now the Justices (and their clerks and their librarians) 
are flooded with information literally at their fingertips.25 Social 
science studies, raw statistics, and other data are all just a Google 
search away. If the Justices want more empirical support for a fac-
tual dimension of their argument, they can find it easily and with-
out the help of anyone outside of the Supreme Court building. 
The impact of this change is quite visible. Justice Breyer, for ex-
ample, is candid about the fact that the Internet provides him a 
powerful new tool for gathering factual data, whether or not those 
data appear in the briefs.26 It is not uncommon for him to quiz an 
22 Davis, supra note 17, at 9–10; id. at 15 (“The Supreme Court’s lawmaking is some-
times based on understanding of the relevant legislative facts and sometimes not. 
When the Court lacks the needed information, it usually makes guesses.”). 
23 Linda Greenhouse, Becoming Justice Blackmun 82–83, 90–91 (2005). 
24 Although the practice of in-house fact finding is relevant to all types of courts, the 
bulk of this Article will focus on the U.S. Supreme Court for several reasons discussed 
in more detail below. See infra Section I.B.  
25 Zick, supra note 16, at 120 (“The courts are literally awash in data, and seem con-
stantly to be clamoring for more.”). 
26 Linda Greenhouse, The Breyer Project: “Why Couldn’t You Work This Thing 
Out?,” 4 Charleston L. Rev. 37, 37 (2010) (“Breyer is the quintessential Enlighten-
ment Supreme Court Justice. He believes in evidence and in expertise and in the 
power of both facts and experts to persuade.”); Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court 
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advocate at oral argument with extra-record statistics which he 
openly admits were gathered through an in-chambers Google 
search.27 And in last term’s decision striking down a law which re-
stricted the sale of violent video games to minors,28 Justice Breyer, 
“with the assistance of the Supreme Court library,” compiled an 
appendix to his dissent of academic journals weighing in on the de-
bate that violent video games cause psychological harm to chil-
dren.29 Citing a YouTube video, he explained that filters on these 
video games are easy to evade since “it takes only a quick search of 
the Internet to find guides explaining how to circumvent any such 
technological controls.”30 Much of this research was not in the re-
cord and did not come from any of the briefs.31
Justice Breyer is not apologetic for his independent research and 
he is not alone. Justice Alito, who concurred in the result of the 
case but disagreed with affording First Amendment protection to 
these video games, peppered his opinion with citations to websites 
(like slashgear.com and popularmechanics.com), touting the “as-
tounding” violence, “antisocial theme,” and “interactive nature” of 
these video games.32 His opinion, in fact, prompted Justice Scalia to 
criticize Alito for his “considerable independent research.”33
And not to be outdone, Justice Thomas’s dissent in the same 
case cites fifty-nine sources to establish the fact that the Founding 
generation believed parents had complete authority over their 
children’s development.34 Fifty-seven of those sources cannot be 
Scorecard, N.Y. Times, July 13, 2011, 9:30 PM, http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/
2011/07/13/a-supreme-court-scorecard/. 
27 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 41, Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 
U.S. 47 (2007) (Nos. 06-84, 06-100) (Breyer, J., questioning) (“So I looked up on the 
Internet approximately what percent of the people have the best credit score and 
that’s about 1 percent.”). 
28 Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2742 (2011). 
29 Id. at 2771 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
30 Id. at 2770–71 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
31 Id. at 2739 n.8 (majority opinion) (“The vast preponderance of [Justice Breyer’s] 
research is outside the record . . . .”). 
32 Id. at 2748 nn.7–10, 2749 nn.11–14 & 2750 nn.15–18 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing 
extra-record research). 
33 Id. at 2738 (majority opinion). 
34 Id. at 2751–58 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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found in the briefs—party briefs or amicus briefs—and were thus 
the product of in-house research.35
This Article will explore how the modern change in access to in-
formation has and will affect the Court’s approach to legislative 
facts. This important question has largely evaded scholarly atten-
tion, perhaps reflecting the erroneous assumption that independent 
factual research at the Court is the exception and not the rule.36 I 
will demonstrate that in the last decade or so, questions of legisla-
tive fact are being researched “in house”—that is, without reliance 
on the parties or amici—at an astonishing rate. While surely some 
in-house research by the Justices and their staff has always oc-
curred, the Internet makes it easier, faster, and more convenient. I 
will argue that this new approach to fact finding is troubling and 
requires us to rethink our entire process for judicial evaluation of 
legislative facts. 
My research reveals over one hundred examples of Supreme 
Court opinions from the last fifteen years that make assertions of 
legislative fact supported by an authority never mentioned in any 
of the briefs.37 And, of the 120 cases from 2000 to 2010 that political 
scientists label the “most salient Supreme Court decisions”—
largely measured by whether they appear on the front pages of 
newspapers38—fifty-six percent of them contain at least one asser-
tion of legislative fact supported by sources found “in house.” 
35 Id. 
36 Only a handful of scholars have recognized this new reality. See Richard B. Cap-
palli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of “Legislative Facts”, 75 Temp. L. 
Rev. 99, 103 (2002); Judge Cathy Cochran, Surfing the Web for a Brandeis Brief, 70 
Tex. B.J. 780 (2007); Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 
12 Yale J.L. & Tech. 1 (2009). Most recently and most on point, Brianne Gorod has 
asked some very important questions about how appellate courts treat legislative facts 
generally. See Gorod, supra note 10. 
37 All examples are listed in an appendix on file with the Virginia Law Review Asso-
ciation. As explained below, I do not claim this represents an exhaustive list. 
38 As will be described infra, two indexes were used to generate the most salient (or 
more visible) Supreme Court decisions from each term. The first one (from Professors 
Epstein and Segal) measures salience by whether the opinion made the front page of 
The New York Times. The second one, the CQ guide, uses a more subjective meas-
urement from journalists and commentators. Both indexes are popular among politi-
cal scientists. See, e.g., Theodore S. Arrington & Saul Brenner, Strategic Voting for 
Damage Control on the Supreme Court, 57 Pol. Res. Q. 565, 571–72 (2004); Saul 
Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Measuring Salience on the Supreme Court: A Re-
search Note, 43 Jurimetrics J. 99 (2002); Todd A. Collins & Christopher A. Cooper, 
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This Article seeks to accomplish two goals. First, I will demon-
strate the prevalence of in-house fact gathering at the U.S. Su-
preme Court. I will show that virtually all of the Justices do it re-
gardless of whether they are traditionally labeled liberal or 
conservative, and they cite authorities on a wide range of subject 
matters (from biology to history to golf). I will also seek to estab-
lish a taxonomy of in-house fact finding. I will catalogue what type 
of legislative facts in-house research is used to support: facts that 
go to the practical consequences of the decisions, facts that are a 
critical part of the doctrinal inquiry, and facts that are used rhetori-
cally—when a Justice has enough information to decide a case but 
makes his position more persuasive with independently discovered 
data. And finally, I will describe where these sources come from: 
letters from agencies requested by the Supreme Court librarians, 
raw data found online, historical sources, traditional law reviews, 
and others. 
Having established that fact finding occurs frequently outside 
the adversarial system at the Supreme Court, the second goal of 
this Article is to explore why we should care. As noted, there are 
currently no rules regulating in-house fact finding of this sort. 
While that relaxed approach may have been appropriate before, I 
argue that new digital fact-gathering methods have changed the 
calculus and should force us to rethink the procedural vacuum. In-
dependent judicial research is now as easy as the click of a mouse, 
and the amount of factual information available to review is basi-
cally infinite. But with this new tool come some new risks—the 
possibility of mistake, unfairness to the parties, and judicial en-
shrinement of biased data that can now be quickly posted to the 
world by anyone without cost. 
In-house judicial fact finding is thus no longer an isolated prac-
tice that can be ignored. Instead, I suggest two radically different 
approaches: either we shut down in-house fact finding with stricter 
procedural rules, or we open up the evaluation of legislative fact to 
invite broader participation. These two approaches, I submit, map 
onto the greater debate between judicial minimalists and judicial 
Case Salience and Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decisions: Toward a New 
Measure, 65 Pol. Res. Q. 396, 398–401 (2012); Paul M. Collins, Jr., The Consistency of 
Judicial Choice, 70 J. Pol. 861, 863 (2008); Paul J. Wahlbeck, Strategy and Constraints 
on Supreme Court Opinion Assignment, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1729, 1750 n.85 (2006). 
  
1264 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 98:1255 
 
maximalists.39 The reason we should care, therefore, about in-house 
fact finding is ultimately because the decision to do it reflects on 
the greater debate over judicial philosophy and role. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. The first two Parts will de-
scribe the prevalence of in-house fact gathering—using the Su-
preme Court as a case study—by systematically exploring when it 
happens, how it happens, and the purposes for which independ-
ently obtained research is put to use. Part III will then argue that 
in-house fact finding in today’s digital age is worrisome. Part IV 
will discuss what should be done about it. 
I. PREVALENCE OF IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING AT THE SUPREME 
COURT 
A. Defining the Terms and the Quest 
Just as the line between law and fact is a slippery one, articulat-
ing a precise definition of a legislative fact (as compared to other 
facts) is similarly challenging. To borrow insight from Fred 
Schauer, however, “all distinctions potentially have borderline 
cases, and . . . although lawyers, particularly, are likely to be preoc-
cupied with dusk when people ask them about the distinction be-
tween night and day,” this does not take away the basic value of 
the distinction in the first place.40
With that in mind, this Article adopts the following distinctions 
and definitions. First, as others have helpfully defined it, an asser-
tion of fact is a descriptive statement that can (at least theoreti-
cally) be falsified.41 This feature of a fact arguably distinguishes it 
from statements of value or policy preferences.42 Facts can then be 
subdivided using a well-recognized distinction articulated by Ken-
39 As will be described below, minimalists believe in “judicial modesty”—that each 
case should be decided narrowly, shallowly, and one at a time—while maximalists 
think the rule of law is improved when judges are free to issue broad, fully theorized 
decisions designed to provide guidance. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a 
Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999). 
40 Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal Information and the Delegaliza-
tion of Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 495, 498 (2000). 
41 Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 
145, 150. 
42 Id. 
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neth Culp Davis in 1942:43 adjudicative facts are those that “relate 
specifically to the activities or characteristics of the litigants, and 
are facts that would typically go to the jury in a jury trial.”44 This 
sort of fact is the principal means by which judges apply doctrine: 
Did the police read the defendant his Miranda rights? Was the 
faulty toaster covered by the warranty? Were the funeral protes-
tors intending only to persuade, or were they engaged in physical 
intimidation?45
Legislative facts, by contrast, are generalized statements about 
the world that help the court decide questions of law and policy.46 
Importantly, as David Faigman has clarified, legislative facts are 
not only those used to announce new legal rules.47 A court may also 
use legislative facts to apply rules by, for example, showing the cus-
tomary way of doing things in a particular community, explaining 
43 Davis, supra note 5, at 402–03; see also Laurens Walker & John Monahan, Social 
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 Va. L. Rev. 559, 561 (1987) 
(“Though the legislative-adjudicative distinction was developed in the context of ad-
ministrative law, a broader application ensued and today the usefulness of the distinc-
tion is widely recognized.”). 
44 See, supra note 6. 
45 I do not suggest that adjudicative facts are always clear-cut, nor are they always 
left to a jury or trial judge to decide. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378–86 (2007), per-
haps provides the best modern example of Supreme Court Justices evaluating trial 
evidence. Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Har-
ris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 837, 838 (2009). For an 
intriguing take on how our preexisting bias can influence our perception of facts, see 
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the Speech-
Conduct Distinction, 64 Stan. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755706. 
46 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Text § 7.03 (3d ed. 1972); David L. 
Faigman, Defining Empirical Frames of Reference in Constitutional Cases: Unravel-
ing the As-Applied Versus Facial Distinction in Constitutional Law, 36 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 631, 635 (2009); Walker & Monahan, supra note 43, at 569 (noting that 
generality is the central feature of a legislative fact). But see Ann Woolhandler, Re-
thinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L. Rev. 111, 114 (1988) 
(“The key difference between adjudicative and legislative facts is not the characteris-
tics of particular versus general facts, but rather, evidence whose proof has a more es-
tablished place and more predictable effect within a framework of established legal 
rules as distinct from evidence that is more manifestly designed to create the rules.”). 
47 David Faigman’s work—and in particular his recent book Constitutional Fic-
tions—helpfully sub-classifies legislative facts according to the function they serve in 
constitutional cases. So, for example, a “constitutional doctrinal fact” is one the Court 
asserts in support of its choice of a new legal rule, whereas a “constitutional review-
able fact” transcends any single case but still applies an established legal standard 
rather than announcing a new one. Faigman, supra note 5, at 46–48. 
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an expected psychological response in certain circumstances, dem-
onstrating the prevalence of a particular police practice, or predict-
ing practical consequences from a contemplated legal rule.48 Al-
though these statements are perhaps more common in 
constitutional cases, they are not limited to only those decisions.49 
As I use the phrase, a legislative fact includes any generalized fact 
about the world—not specific to the parties—that a judge uses to 
decide a case or to make his opinion more persuasive. 
A recent example of reliance on legislative fact can be seen in 
Sykes v. United States, a statutory interpretation case decided in 
June 2011.50 There the Court held that fleeing from a police officer 
in a car counted as a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Ca-
reer Criminal Act.51 “Although statistics are not dispositive,” Jus-
tice Kennedy wrote for the majority, “here they confirm the com-
monsense conclusion that Indiana’s vehicular flight crime is a 
violent felony.”52
Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas (in concurrence) recited 
statistics about the injury and fatality rates connected with vehicu-
lar flight.53 Much of the data discussed came from studies that were 
not part of the record below, or specific to the Indiana law in ques-
tion.54 They were instead “legislative facts,” descriptive statements 
used to answer a question about the world generally—namely, how 
inherently violent is it to flee from the police? 
48 Ellie Margolis, Beyond Brandeis: Exploring the Uses of Non-Legal Materials in 
Appellate Briefs, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 197, 198 (2000). 
49 Kenneth C. Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 Colum. L. Rev. 945, 959 (1955) (“The judi-
cial practice of going beyond the record for legislative facts is most pronounced in 
constitutional cases, but is not limited to those cases.”). 
50 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
51 Id. at 2270. 
52 Id. at 2274. 
53 Id. at 2274–75, 2279. 
54 Sykes represents an excellent example of legislative facts arising at a late hour in 
litigation, but most of the statistics used by Justice Kennedy—although not in the re-
cord—did come from the briefs and would therefore not be considered the product of 
“in-house” research as I am using that phrase. That being said, some of the statistics 
used to support factual assertions in Justice Thomas’s concurrence and in Justice Ka-
gan’s dissent do come from in-house research. See, e.g., id. at 2280 (Thomas, J., con-
curring) (citing a series of newspaper articles for the proposition that “the lawsuits 
that result from these chases” are well known); id. at 2290 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(asserting that people may not want to stop for police officers and using newspaper 
articles for support). 
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Justice Scalia, in dissent, called out his colleagues for this use of 
extra-record statistics: “Supreme Court briefs are an inappropriate 
place to develop the key facts in a case.”55 Noting the risk that 
methodological flaws or bias in the studies will go untested by the 
adversarial process, Scalia accused the majority of “untested judi-
cial factfinding masquerading as statutory interpretation.”56
Technically, there was nothing procedurally untoward about the 
Court using extra-record statistics in this way. Procedural rules de-
veloped for adjudicative facts are largely inapplicable when it 
comes to legislative facts.57 Legislative facts can be—but do not 
have to be—the subject of expert testimony in the trial court.58 Au-
thorities to support assertions of legislative fact can—but need 
not—come from the record below.59 And district court decisions on 
legislative facts may—but are not entitled to—be given deference 
from reviewing courts.60 The Federal Rules of Evidence not only 
55 Id. at 2286 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56 Id. 
57 Gorod, supra note 10, at 44–45; see also Davis, supra note 17, at 5. The Federal 
Rules of Evidence reflect this relaxed attitude towards judicial notice of legislative 
facts. According to the advisory committee notes, when dealing with legislative facts: 
[T]he judge is unrestricted in his investigation and conclusion. He may reject 
the propositions of either party or of both parties. He may consult the sources 
of pertinent data to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make 
an independent search for persuasive data or rest content with what he has or 
what the parties present. . . . [T]he parties do no more than to assist; they con-
trol no part of the process. 
Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee’s note (citing Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial 
Notice, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 269, 270–71 (1944)); see also Woolhandler, supra note 46, at 
112 (“The advisory committee believed that judicial absorption of general nonlegal 
knowledge should not be circumscribed . . . .”). 
58 Faigman, supra note 5, at 97–98. 
59 Keeton, supra note 8, at 44; see also Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) advisory committee’s 
note (quoted supra note 57). 
60 Faigman, supra note 5, at 114 (noting that the Supreme Court “has no overriding 
theory of when it should be deferential to other bodies—judicial and nonjudicial—
that have made findings of constitutional fact”). The confusion in the law reaches far 
beyond the Supreme Court to courts of all levels and in state courts as well as federal 
ones. See A Woman’s Choice v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir. 2002) (finding 
that legislative facts should be reviewed “without deference in order to prevent the 
idiosyncrasies of a single judge or jury from having far-reaching legal effects”); 
Gorod, supra note 10, at 45; Andrew Koppleman, Power in the Facts, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 4, 2010, 10:03 PM, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/08/04/gay-
marriage-and-the-constitution/judge-walkers-factual-findings (discussing what is to 
happen to Judge Walker’s factual findings in the California gay marriage case). 
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exempt legislative facts from the restrictions on judicial notice, but 
the advisory committee notes actually encourage their “unfettered 
use”—explicitly stating that “the parties do no more than to assist; 
they control no part of the process.”61 In sum, there are simply no 
rules regulating how the judiciary is to receive or evaluate proof of 
legislative fact, leaving David Faigman—a leading scholar in this 
field—to conclude that the law on this procedural question is un-
regulated, “chaotic,” and “a slap-dash affair.”62
Putting aside for the moment the debate on whether this relaxed 
procedure is a good thing,63 it is important to acknowledge two sig-
nificant changes to judicial decision making since 1975 when legis-
lative facts were exempted from the scope of judicial notice. The 
first change, as described above, is the radical transformation in the 
way the world accesses factual information.64
Equally important, however, is the second relevant change: a 
turn towards documented empirical factual support for legal argu-
ment.65 It used to be the norm for a judge to take account of inde-
pendently obtained facts without owning up to it (that is, without 
61 Fed. R. Evid. 201(a) & accompanying advisory committee’s note; Thornburg, su-
pra note 11, at 153 (“The Federal Rules of Evidence and their state counterparts limit 
only judicial notice of adjudicative facts. Further, the Advisory Committee Notes en-
courage unfettered use of legislative facts, arguing that judicial access to legislative 
facts should not be restricted to any limitation in the form of indisputability or formal 
notice.”). 
62 Faigman, supra note 5, at xii, 98. 
63 Edward R. Becker & Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence After Six-
teen Years—The Effect of “Plain Meaning” Jurisprudence, the Need for an Advisory 
Committee on the Rules of Evidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the 
Rules, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 857, 899–900 (1992) (“The Rules’ failure to address leg-
islative facts has been criticized as too narrow and unambitious. This lack of guidance 
has led to concerns surrounding the process for noticing legislative facts.”). 
64 Of course the Justices themselves need not be Google-savvy. As Supreme Court 
law clerks (who are on average in their mid-twenties) become more technologically 
expert, the research methodologies in chambers will change as well. Moreover, em-
pirical studies show that with more law clerks comes more citation to legal precedent, 
and there is every reason to assume this would hold true for factual citations as well. 
See Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of 
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 535 (noting that an increased use 
of law clerks corresponds with an increased use of citations to precedent). 
65 See Zick, supra note 16 (“Constitutional law is now in the throes of a widespread 
empirical turn, a quantitative mood swing that is consistent with a more general socie-
tal turn toward all things scientific.”). 
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citation).66 Now—perhaps for a variety of reasons—judges seem to 
feel an increased pressure to add a citation to their assertions of 
legislative fact.67
This may seem at first like a distinction without a difference—
does it really matter if a judge drops a footnote to support a fact or 
is merely influenced to a certain result by his independent re-
search? But citations matter. As Fred Schauer has persuasively ar-
gued, questions of citation are really questions of authority—and 
authority, after all, lies at the heart of what the law means.68
A citation for support in a judicial opinion, he tells us, is the le-
gal equivalent of saying “‘I am not making this up.’”69 And for fac-
tual assertions this has become increasingly important. When a 
judge makes a generalized statement of fact without reliance on 
authority—as when Chief Justice Marshall asserted in Gibbons v. 
Ogden that “[a]ll America understands, and has uniformly under-
stood, the word ‘commerce,’ to comprehend navigation”—that fac-
tual observation is wrapped up in the legal proclamation and is 
treated as such.70
66 Davis, supra note 49, at 953 (“[T]he difference between appearing to stay within 
the record and frankly acknowledging resort to extra-record sources for legislative 
facts is usually only a difference in the degree of articulation on the grounds for deci-
sion.”); Faigman, supra note 7, at 545 (“Historically most constitutional fact-finding 
depended on the Justices’ best guess about the matter.”). 
67 Others have observed how Supreme Court decisions (particularly constitutional 
ones) have become increasingly empirical—that is, they now rely on “data, scientific 
methods, and scientific conventions in search of greater decisional objectivity and ac-
curacy.” Zick, supra note 16, at 140; see also Faigman, supra note 7, at 547; Tracy L. 
Meares, Three Objections to the Use of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Proce-
dure—and Three Answers, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev. 851, 855 (“Whether or not judges cur-
rently are able to handle social science research with expert ease, judges increasingly 
have suggested in opinions that they would like to see empirical work that is relevant 
to the issues presented to them . . . .”); Zick, supra note 16, at 120 (“The broad em-
pirical turn . . . is due, at least in part, to the ever-expanding pool of data available to 
the courts.”). 
68 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931, 1935–36 
(2008). 
69 Id. at 1950; id. at 1943 (“As with the parent saying, ‘Because I said so,’ authority is 
in an important way the fallback position when substantive persuasion is ineffec-
tive.”); see also Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism, 100 
Colum. L. Rev. 1454, 1482 (2000) (explaining that explicitly giving reasons for deci-
sions relates to the judicial craft “the way the Hippocratic Oath is a norm associated 
with medical craft; it is essential to the enterprise”). 
70 Faigman, supra note 7, at 545 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 
190 (1824)). 
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But when a judge adds empirical support for his factual state-
ment it changes the nature of the assertion. For one thing, the au-
thority makes the statement look more like a fact (something that 
is either true or false) and less like a legal holding or casually ut-
tered policy preference. This matters because the authority pro-
tects and entrenches the statement by elevating its validity with a 
stamp of scientific imprimatur. Of course it opens the door to fu-
ture challenges about the factual basis for the claim, but our legal 
system treats legal findings and factual ones differently—questions 
of deference are different, for one thing, and future cases are more 
often brought to challenge legal conclusions rather than factual 
ones.71
A related effect, which comes when a judge drops a factual foot-
note instead of making a bald assertion of fact, is the increase the 
authority gives to the entire opinion’s persuasive power. Perhaps 
because we all have access to so much information on our phones 
now, a modern audience increasingly demands empirical support 
before accepting an argument.72 Judicial reliance on authority for 
legislative fact, therefore, becomes ever more important to con-
vincing the public that the judge has the right result. 
For this reason, I am not interested in the theoretical possibility 
of a judge researching legislative facts on his own. Surely, few peo-
ple doubt that almost all judges do this,73 and even fewer doubt 
there is any way to prevent it if we wanted to. I am interested, in-
stead, in those instances when a judge or Justice supports his posi-
tion on such a fact with citation to authority he found outside of the 
adversarial process—reliance on what I call “in-house” judicial re-
search of fact. 
So what does it mean to find a fact in house? For purposes of 
this Article, “in-house” fact finding means a Justice supports an as-
sertion of legislative fact with an authority that he found independ-
71 The different treatment factual and legal assertions receive over time is an issue 
which deserves more attention than I can give it here, and one I hope to pursue in fu-
ture work. 
72 Meares, supra note 67, at 851 (“Recent studies show that, over the past decade, 
judges and lawyers have begun to cite to empirical studies in their work with increas-
ing regularity.”). 
73 Thomas B. Marvell, Appellate Courts and Lawyers 192 (1978). 
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ently—that is, not from any of the party briefs or from the briefs 
submitted by amici curiae.74
A terrific example of in-house fact gathering can be seen in the 
Graham v. Florida case decided in 2010.75 The question before the 
Court was whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited sentencing 
juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses to life without pa-
role. In looking for a “national consensus” on this question, the 
Court sought to establish just how many minors nationwide were 
serving such a sentence. The Court explained, “[a]lthough in the 
first instance it is for the litigants to provide data to aid the Court, 
we have been able to supplement the study’s findings.”76 It then 
cites several letters from different state departments of corrections 
all addressed to the Supreme Court library and all on file with the 
clerk. It further supplemented those numbers with links to news-
paper articles from local counties reporting the sentences. None of 
these sources of information were presented by the parties or even 
from their amici; they all represent research conducted “in house” 
at the Court.77
B. How Common Is Modern In-House Fact Finding? 
If Graham were just a one-off example of the Court supplement-
ing the record and briefs with factual research conducted in house, 
there would hardly be cause for alarm. But Graham is decidedly 
not an aberration. What follows is a descriptive account of how 
common it is for Supreme Court decisions to contain factual au-
thorities that were not in the record and not presented to the Jus-
tices through any of the briefs. 
74 Legislative facts presented to the Court through amicus briefs present their own 
issues and challenging questions. These are questions I plan to pursue in a subsequent 
article. For present purposes, however, I am counting amicus submissions of fact as 
within the adversarial process because the litigants may respond to them before a de-
cision is rendered (through reply briefs or at oral argument). This means that if a de-
cision makes an assertion of legislative fact in reliance on an amicus brief—like the 
citation about women regretting abortions in Carhart—it does not count as in-house 
research for purposes of this Article. 
75 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
76 Id. at 2024. 
77 It is certainly possible for adjudicative facts to be researched in house as well. One 
can imagine a judge revisiting the scene of a crime, for example. Those instances—
while important—are beyond the scope of this Article. 
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Although the phenomenon of in-house fact finding is not at all 
limited to the Supreme Court, I focused my research there for sev-
eral reasons. One practical reason is that all modern briefs filed at 
the Supreme Court are digitally available, thus making it possible 
to cross-check factual authorities relied on by opinions with the 
ones presented by the parties and amici. Moreover, because the 
Supreme Court is one of last resort and limited jurisdiction, Su-
preme Court Justices will often be asked to look beyond the case at 
hand and to shape rules for disputes in the future.78 This means 
they will be pressed to think about facts that transcend any one 
case, and will provide a better laboratory for exploring how these 
legislative fact statements are supported. Finally, although the ad-
versarial system does not work perfectly at any court, the Supreme 
Court Bar is comprised of some of the best advocates in the coun-
try. When that expertise is combined with an unprecedented recep-
tion of Supreme Court amicus curiae briefs (the filing of which has 
increased 800% in recent years),79 Supreme Court Justices cannot 
help but be inundated with factual research presented from within 
the adversarial process. If the Justices, therefore, are reaching be-
yond the briefs—party briefs and amicus briefs—to conduct inde-
pendent factual research, then one can assume the temptation will 
be all the greater for lower court judges who have fewer available 
resources from the parties. 
My research reveals 103 examples of decisions in the last fifteen 
years when a Supreme Court Justice has supported a factual claim 
with in-house research.80 I certainly do not claim to have exhausted 
the universe of in-house research nor do I purport to make any 
empirical claims on causation. But before diving into the examples 
I did find, a few words on how I found them. Sometimes the Court, 
78 Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable Cases, 32 Fla. 
St. U. L. Rev. 323, 325–26 (2005) (noting that Justices “announce rules that apply be-
yond the actual litigants and cases before them” and commenting on the Court’s will-
ingness to craft these rules in cases that involve plaintiffs with nongeneralizable 
claims). 
79 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs 
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 752 (2000); Kelly J. Lynch, Best 
Friends? Supreme Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & 
Pol. 33, 34 (2004). 
80 A full list of my examples can be found in an appendix on file with the Virginia 
Law Review Association. 
  
2012] Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding 1273 
 
as in Graham, is quite candid when it supplements the record and 
thus many of these cases were found through simple word searches 
to key phrases like “on file with” or “my research shows.” Each in-
stance of a citation found using these word searches was confirmed 
by cross-referencing every brief filed in the case to ensure that the 
source was not presented by the parties or their amici and could 
not be found in the joint appendix. 
Plenty of other times, however, the Court cites to in-house re-
search without announcing it has done so. To create an illustrative 
list of these instances, I needed a more structured inquiry. I gener-
ated a list of the most “salient” (or “important” or “landmark”)81 
Supreme Court decisions in recent years (from 2000–2010). To do 
this, I borrowed two indexes often used by political scientists: the 
Epstein-Segal index and the CQ Press index. The Epstein-Segal 
index (created by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal) measures salience 
by asking whether the decision was covered on the front page of 
The New York Times the day after it was decided. The CQ Press 
index measures salience by compiling subjective opinions from 
journalists and Supreme Court watchers.82
Combining these two indexes revealed 120 “most salient” Su-
preme Court decisions from 2000–2010. With the help of extraor-
dinarily patient research assistants, we read all of those cases and 
highlighted assertions of legislative fact (based on the definition 
outlined above); we then cross-referenced the sources used to sup-
port those facts with all the briefs filed in the case. If a Justice 
made an assertion of fact followed by a citation to a source that 
was not mentioned in any brief (including amicus briefs and the 
81 Collins & Cooper, supra note 38, at 2 (defining the most salient Supreme Court 
decisions as the most “important” or “landmark” or “controversial”). 
82 Both indexes are widely used by political scientists. See, e.g., Brenner & Arring-
ton, supra note 38, at 100–01 (evaluating the different methods of determining sali-
ence of Supreme Court decision making and determining that the CQ index was “the 
best of the lot”); Collins & Cooper, supra note 38, at 3 (discussing the various meas-
ures of case salience and their advantages or disadvantages); Richard L. Vining, Jr. & 
Teena Wilhelm, Measuring Case Salience in State Courts of Last Resort, 64 Pol. Res. 
Q. 559, 560–61 (2011) (detailing publications which have used the Epstein-Segal New 
York Times salience measure for Supreme Court decisions). 
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joint appendix), that authority was labeled the product of “in-
house” research.83
For the reasons articulated above about the importance of legal 
authority, I did not count an assertion of legislative fact that was 
not followed by citation (although to be sure those unsupported 
statements were present). I also did not count instances where the 
Court appeared to be reviewing the record on its own de novo. Re-
gardless of its propriety, reviewing the record below anew does not 
qualify as in-house research of legislative fact as I have defined it. 
By my count, 90 of the 120 most salient Supreme Court decisions 
from 2000 to 2010 contained at least one assertion of legislative fact 
supported by citation. Of those 90, seventy-seven percent contain 
at least one authority for those facts that was not present in the 
briefs. Acknowledging that identifying a legislative fact can poten-
tially be tricky, a more conservative approach is just to change the 
denominator, and look at the percentage of the total 120 salient 
cases that make a factual assertion supported by a source found 
outside the adversarial process. Even that conservative estimate 
shows that a remarkable fifty-six percent of these cases contain at 
least one factual source discovered in house—meaning outside the 
record, not presented by the parties, and even beyond the scope of 
the numerous amicus briefs filed. 
Given how common it seems to be to cite in-house research for 
factual statements, it should come as no surprise that all members 
of the Court do it—regardless of whether they are traditionally la-
beled liberal or conservative. In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Pro-
ject, a case about the material support to terrorism statute, Chief 
Justice Roberts relied on a book from an investigative journalist to 
support his assertion that benign skills—like negotiation—can be 
used to engage in terrorism.84 Justice Stevens, in Massachusetts v. 
EPA, cited data gleaned from the National Oceanic & Atmos-
pheric Administration website to demonstrate a dramatic rise in 
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.85 Justice Breyer relied on statis-
tics from a pediatric journal to indicate a lack of popular consensus 
83 We also checked for citations to the record. If a Justice cited a source and fol-
lowed it with a record citation—even if the source was not in the briefs—we did not 
count that as in-house research. 
84 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2725 (2010). 
85 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007). 
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across regions concerning gun safety in McDonald v. City of Chi-
cago (the Court’s most recent Second Amendment decision).86 And 
Justice Thomas relied on statistics from the Educational Digest to 
show why schools need latitude under the Fourth Amendment to 
fight the “increasingly alarming crisis” of prescription drug abuse 
among teens.87 None of these authorities were presented to the 
Court through the adversarial process. 
Even in their short time on the Court, Justices Sotomayor and 
Kagan already show inclinations towards in-house fact finding. In 
the Sykes case discussed above (concerning whether fleeing from 
the police is inherently violent), Justice Kagan’s dissent relies on 
several newspaper articles she found to support the claim that peo-
ple are generally reluctant to stop for police officers.88 And in a dif-
ferent case from the same year, Justice Sotomayor reached outside 
the briefs and the record to cite statistics on how rare evidentiary 
hearings have become in federal habeas proceedings.89
Some of this in-house research is used by Justices in concurrence 
or dissent. And certainly implications of the use of in-house re-
search will differ depending on the posture of the Justice using it. It 
would be a mistake, however, to conclude that only Justices on the 
losing end of a case veer from the briefs. At least one citation to in-
house factual research can be found in a majority opinion in thirty-
six of the ninety most salient cases—forty percent—where a legisla-
tive fact was considered. 
Examples of in-house research cited by majority opinions are 
abundant. Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court in United 
States v. Stevens, cites an article from Mediaweek magazine for the 
fact that there is a “national market for hunting-related depictions 
in which a living animal is intentionally killed.”90 Several of the 
86 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3138 (2010) (citing Catherine A. Okoro et al., Prevalence of 
Household Firearms and Firearm-Storage Practices in the 50 States and the District 
of Columbia: Findings From the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, 2002, 
116 Pediatrics 370, 372 (2005)). 
87 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2653 (2009) (Thomas, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Ken Schroeder, Get Teens Off 
Drugs, Educ. Dig., Dec. 2006, at 75). 
88 131 S. Ct. at 2290 n.3 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
89 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1413 (2011) (Sotomayor J., dissenting) (citing 
N. King, F. Cheesman & B. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in 
U.S. District Courts 35–36 (2007)). 
90 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010). 
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sources Justice Scalia uses in District of Columbia v. Heller to set 
forth the history of the language of the Second Amendment were 
drawn from outside of the party briefs or the hundreds of amicus 
briefs filed in that case.91 And in Kennedy v. Louisiana, Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion uses statistics posted on a website to 
show the prevalence of child rape convictions.92
To rely on an independently discovered factual source one time 
in an opinion is one thing; to rely on these extra-record sources ex-
tensively is another. In order to capture opinions that extensively 
rely on in-house research, we noted which of those 120 most salient 
Supreme Court opinions had four or more factual statements sup-
ported with citations to sources not in the briefs. The percentage of 
such cases was smaller, of course, but still surprisingly large. Of the 
ninety cases that involve at least one question of legislative fact, 
forty-two of them (forty-seven percent) have opinions that cite 
four or more factual sources not in the record and not presented by 
the briefs. 
Once again the Justices who rely extensively on such in-house 
research cannot be identified by the politics of the President who 
appointed them. Examples of such extensive in-house fact finding 
include: Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Graham v. 
Florida,93 Justice Alito’s majority opinion in McDonald v. City of 
Chicago,94 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart,95 Jus-
tice Thomas’s concurrence in Safford Unified School District No. 1 
v. Redding,96 Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Citizens United v. 
91 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2789, 2791–93, 2795–98, 2802, 2807, 2812, 2817 (2008) (making 
twenty assertions of historical fact, supported by some sources coming from the briefs 
but more than thirty sources from outside the briefs). 
92 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (citing Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, National Incident-Based Reporting System, 2005, Study No. 4720, 
available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu).  
93 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024, 2029, 2033 (2010) (relying on nine sources drawn from out-
side the briefs to discuss the prevalence of life sentences for juveniles). 
94 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3037, 3041, 3044 n.28, 3045 n.29, 3047, 3049 (2010) (relying on 
twelve non-brief sources to recount the history surrounding the Second Amendment). 
95 550 U.S. 124, 173 n.3, 183 n.7, 184 nn.8–9 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (relying 
on sixteen sources from outside the briefs which discuss how abortion procedures af-
fect women). 
96 129 S. Ct 2633, 2650–57 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (relying on eighteen sources found in house to establish the “alarming national 
crisis” of prescription drug abuse by teenagers). 
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FEC,97 and Justice Breyer’s dissents in Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub-
lic Company Accounting Oversight Board and Parents Involved in 
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.98
In-house fact finding is thus not a rarity in any sense of the word. 
It happens in many cases, can be found in opinions from many Jus-
tices, and can account for a substantial percentage of the factual ci-
tations in any one opinion. Given the change in access to informa-
tion, and the new emphasis on being persuasive by being empirical, 
it stands to reason that in-house fact finding will only become more 
prevalent over time. It is a practice, therefore, which demands fur-
ther consideration. 
II. A TAXONOMY OF IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING 
Statements of legislative fact are not all the same. Some—like 
African American children are stigmatized by segregated schools, 
or fleeing from the police is inherently violent—are critical to the 
outcome of a case.99 Others are merely used rhetorically to bolster 
an argument—to show practical consequences of a different out-
come, for example, or to set the stage by emphasizing the emerging 
significance of an issue. 
Authorities for factual assertions are also varied. Citing statistics 
published in a peer-reviewed journal will likely be more persuasive 
than similar statistics culled from an article posted online or gath-
ered by the Supreme Court library and never published at all. And 
perhaps historical facts (“The Framers all had guns”) are different 
from facts that originate in social science (“Children are develop-
mentally affected by divorce”), which are different from facts 
about nature (“Carbon dioxide causes global warming”). 
97 130 S. Ct. 876, 925–27 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring) (making eight assertions 
about speech at the Founding, supported by nine non-brief sources). 
98 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3166, 
3168, 3170, 3178, 3180–81, 3212 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (making eleven asser-
tions of fact including a long appendix on the structure of federal agencies and relying 
on eighteen different sources not in any briefs); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Se-
attle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 869–77 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing origi-
nal research in an appendix to show how many states have adopted inter-district racial 
integration in school districting). 
99 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 869–77; Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2272 
(2011).  
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What follows is an attempt to identify the various types of in-
house fact finding, to provide examples of each, and to discuss im-
plications of the differences. 
A. What Factual Assertions Are Supported By Authorities Found 
“In House?” 
Two lines of inquiry help distinguish the types of facts Supreme 
Court Justices are researching themselves. The first involves the 
subject matter of the fact and the second involves the purpose for 
which the fact is used. 
1. Subject Matter of Facts Found In House 
Justices are not shy about tackling a whole host of factual subject 
matters on their own. I found opinions citing independently found 
authorities to answer questions of medicine (“How long do symp-
toms of carpel tunnel persist?”100 “What diseases can be attributed 
to obesity?”101), questions about nature (“Can naturally occurring 
silt clog a river and restrict a dam?”102 “How much carbon dioxide 
emissions exist in the atmosphere?”103), and questions of social sci-
ence (“Are poor women more likely to have late-term abor-
tions?”104 “Does the death penalty have a deterrent effect?”105 
“What are the emotional consequences of prison?”106 “Do people 
take race into account when evaluating jurors?”107). 
100 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002) (citing medical 
journals outside the record on a case about whether carpel tunnel is a debilitating 
condition under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
101 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 587 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citing medical risks of obesity to point out that tobacco is not unique in the risks it 
poses to the health of children). 
102 Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 774–75 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(citing two articles from The New York Times and one from the Los Angeles Times on 
the effect of silt on waterways in a case interpreting the Clean Water Act).  
103 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 507 (2007) (citing the website of the De-
partment of Commerce). 
104 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 173 n.3 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
105 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 614–15 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
106 Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 (2010) (citing Nat’l Prison Rape Elimina-
tion Comm’n, National Prison Rape Elimination Report 4 (June 2009)). 
107 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268 (2005) (citing various studies to show that 
discriminatory use of preemptory challenges is still a problem in spite of the decision 
in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)). 
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The Justices go beyond the adversary system to assert facts 
about economics,108 international practices,109 and emerging new 
technology.110 And it is quite common for them to cite raw statistics 
of all types—collected from websites, solicited from agencies, or 
found in a journal—about a huge range of prevailing practices or 
social norms.111
Although a slightly different animal (for reasons discussed be-
low), the Justices are also very willing to cite historical facts, even if 
the sources of those facts were not in the briefs or the record. His-
torical sources are at bottom factual ones.112 Debates over original 
intent are really factual disputes about, for example, “whether the 
drafters or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment expected the 
Equal Protection Clause to invalidate segregated schools or 
whether the Free Speech Clause was intended to cover obscen-
ity.”113
It should come as no surprise that Justice Thomas and Justice 
Scalia—committed to principles of originalism—frequently cite his-
108 Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 903 (2007) (citing 
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica (n.s.) 386 (1937)). 
109 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2008) (citing the practice of giving muscle re-
laxers before euthanasia in the Netherlands in a case about the constitutionality of 
lethal injection); McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 882 (2005) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (citing independently found sources for the proposition that “Americans 
attend their places of worship more often than do citizens of other developed na-
tions . . . and describe religion as playing an especially important role in their lives” 
(citations omitted)). 
110 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 964 (2005) 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Wired News and CNET News). 
111 See, e.g., Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2279 (2011) (Thomas J., concur-
ring) (“Many thousands of police chases occur every year. In California and Pennsyl-
vania, which collect statewide pursuit data, police were involved in a combined total 
of more than 8,700 chases in 2007 alone.”); id. at 2274 (majority opinion incorporating 
statistics from Justice Thomas’ concurrence); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Account-
ing Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3184 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (attaching an 
appendix with statistics gathered by the Office of Personnel Management and submit-
ted to the Supreme Court library to demonstrate the number of administrative law 
judges subject to for-cause removal); United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 
(2010) (citing statistics in Mediaweek magazine, outside the record, to demonstrate 
how large the national market is for hunting magazines). 
112 Faigman, supra note 5, at 46 (“[O]riginal intent, one of the most common bases 
for constitutional interpretation is almost wholly fact based.”). 
113 Id. 
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torical sources they researched on their own.114 But they are not the 
only Justices who do so. In Parents Involved in Community Schools 
v. Seattle School District No. 1, Justice Breyer’s dissent contains a 
detailed history about desegregation efforts in this country since 
Brown v. Board of Education, including a fifty-state survey ex-
plaining which states have adopted open-choice plans and statistics 
indicating their success rates over time.115 Much of this information 
was found in house—helpfully cataloged by Breyer in an appen-
dix—but not in the record or presented by the parties. 
Once again, Breyer may be the most candid about his independ-
ent research, but he is not the only one doing it. In decisions inter-
preting the First Amendment’s religious clauses, for example, dif-
ferent Justices take turns citing different historical sources—not in 
the briefs—which alternatively do or do not support invocations of 
God by members of the Founding generation.116
2. How Do the Justices Use In-House Factual Research? 
Perhaps more important than the subject matter of in-house re-
search is the way such factual assertions are put to use. Legislative 
facts are employed in all kinds of ways: to show the prevalence of a 
practice, to stress the societal significance of an issue, to show an 
emerging national consensus, or to establish an historical under-
standing of a word, just to name a few. 
This is certainly not the first attempt to classify the use of legisla-
tive facts—David Faigman, in particular, has done tremendous 
work on that score.117 The question at hand, however, is more spe-
cific: when a Justice conducts original research on a legislative fact, 
114 See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chi., 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3065 & n.4 (2010) (Thomas J., 
concurring) (citing historical sources—some discovered in house—to describe the 
Founding generation’s use of the words “privileges and immunities”); District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2795 n.10 (2008) (collecting historical sources—some 
discovered in house—that use “bear arms” in non-military settings). 
115 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 870 
(2007) (Breyer J., dissenting) (attaching an appendix cataloging sources). 
116 See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 878–80 (2005) (citing James Madi-
son and Justice Story, although noting there are conflicting conclusions); id. at 886 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing George Washington); Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. 
Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 30 (2004) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (citing various examples of 
patriotic invocations of God in the early Republic). 
117 See, e.g., Faigman, supra note 5, at 46–62. 
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for what purpose does he feel comfortable citing his discovery? 
Are authorities found in house only used to serve a kind of “see 
also” function—supplementing what the adversarial process can 
answer? Or are the Justices relying on new, independently discov-
ered factual authorities that are critical to a case’s resolution? 
It turns out the answer is “yes” to both. There is a big divide, I 
think, between facts used rhetorically—only to bolster an argu-
ment’s persuasive power—and facts that are potentially dispositive 
to a case’s outcome. To be sure, both purposes of in-house research 
could be problematic, but in different ways and perhaps on differ-
ent levels. Let us therefore tackle each one separately. 
David Faigman tells us that the Supreme Court “insistently em-
ploys factual arguments rhetorically, as premises that can be ma-
nipulated or massaged in the service of one or another legal out-
come.”118 To use a colorful analogy, one could say Justices use their 
in-house research the way drunks use lampposts—“for support ra-
ther than illumination.”119 Examples of in-house research being 
used this way are plentiful. 
Of the cases I found, the most common rhetorical citation of in-
house-found facts (particularly statistics) was to demonstrate the 
emerging significance of a question to society. So, for example, in 
Safford Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding, Justice Thomas 
cites three different teen surveys and more than a dozen newspa-
per articles—none of which were in the briefs—to convince his col-
leagues that teenage abuse of prescription drugs was an “alarming 
national crisis” justifying strip searches of students without violat-
ing the Fourth Amendment.120 And in United States v. Booker—the 
case that invalidated the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—Justice 
Stevens cites a handful of independently found articles to establish 
that prosecutors bargain with defendants over which facts will form 
the basis for sentencing.121 Neither fact seemed critical to the case’s 
118 Id. at 25. 
119 Adam Liptak, When Rendering Decisions, Judges Are Finding Law Reviews Ir-
relevant, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 2007, at A8 (quoting comments of Hon. Robert D. 
Sack at the Second Circuit Roundtable Discussion on March 8, 2007). 
120 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2653–54 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
121 543 U.S. 220, 290 n.11 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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outcome, but both were used as persuasive ammunition—here, 
specifically, to capture a reader’s attention. 
A similar rhetorical use for such facts is to show the practical 
impact or justification for a law. In Ewing v. California, for exam-
ple, the question before the Court was whether California’s “three 
strikes” repeat offender statute was cruel and unusual punish-
ment.122 Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority to uphold the 
law, recites statistics to support California’s assertion that recidi-
vism was a growing and real problem in the state. For support, she 
cites a study conducted by a reporter for The Sacramento Bee 
newspaper and not submitted to the Court by either party or any 
amici curiae.123
Was this study essential to Justice O’Connor’s (or the rest of the 
majority’s) decision to uphold the law? Would she have written the 
opinion the same way without it? Of course it is impossible to say. 
Presumably the authority adds some sort of persuasive power, or 
else she would not have included it.124
It may be tempting to dismiss the independently found citation 
as superfluous and inconsequential, but that is a temptation worth 
resisting. Paying attention to cited authorities is no trivial matter.125 
Unlike other disciplines (like math or science), the “law’s practice 
of using and announcing its authorities . . . is part and parcel of 
law’s character.”126 Or, as Frank Cross and colleagues put it re-
cently, “[c]itations function something like the currency of the legal 
system.”127  
Ask, in other words, why Justice O’Connor felt the need to cite 
anything; could she not have just written that criminals tend to be 
repeat players and stopped at that? The answer, I believe, is in 
Fred Schauer’s insight that the backbone of law is authoritative: 
“what matters is not what the reason says but where it comes 
122 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003). 
123 Id. at 26. 
124 See Gorod, supra note 10, at 25 n.99 (“[E]ven if judges sometimes use facts as 
rhetorical tools . . . the fact that they often use extra-record facts as those rhetorical 
tools suggests that those facts are also influencing their decisions.”). 
125 Schauer, supra note 68, at 1934–35. 
126 Id. at 1935. 
127 Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of 
Their Use and Significance, 2010 U. Ill. L. Rev. 489, 490. 
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from.”128 Typically, he tells us, we take actions for substantive rea-
sons—we eat spinach because it is good for us, not because we are 
told to do it.129 But in legal decisions, lawyers and judges can resort 
to content-independent reasons, i.e., reliance on the source of the 
reason, or an authority, as opposed to just the substance of the rea-
son. If this is true, then “a great deal turns on what the authorities 
are,”130 and studies, statistics, or other factual sources found outside 
the record or briefing process matter even if they are used 
“merely” to make an argument stronger.131
As for potentially dispositive questions of fact—with answers 
that can turn dissents into majorities and vice versa—it seems even 
less palatable that the Justices go beyond the record on these in-
quiries. And yet they do. 
To begin with, for the skeptical reader, questions of legislative 
fact can indeed be outcome determinative. David Faigman has 
helpfully illustrated this reality in his taxonomy of what he calls 
“constitutional facts.”132 “Constitutional doctrinal facts,” he tells us, 
are facts used to establish the meaning of the Constitution.133 Chief 
examples are questions of original intent, which are, as explained 
above, fact-based questions about the state of the world at one 
time or another: How did the Framers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment feel about segregated schools? Did the authors of the Second 
Amendment intend it to bestow an individual right? 
“Constitutional reviewable facts,” by contrast, are facts that 
“transcend particular disputes” but are used to apply a particular 
128 Schauer, supra note 68, at 1936. 
129 Id. at 1935. 
130 Id. at 1960. 
131 The same response applies to a related variant of in-house research: string cita-
tions which include some sources unearthed by in-house research and some brought 
to the Court’s attention by the parties. My research revealed several examples of that 
“see also” type of in-house research. See, e.g., Barber v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 2499, 2517 
(2010) (citing statistics from the National Prison Rape Elimination Commission Re-
port—not in the briefs—but also citing similar numbers from a Department of Justice 
website which was in the briefs). To be sure, normative concerns are likely lessened 
when a Justice relies on an independently found factual source alongside one from 
within the record. But for the reasons expressed above about the centrality of authori-
ties to law’s very nature, the citation of the new authority should still raise concerns. 
132 Faigman, supra note 5, at 46. 
133 Id. 
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constitutional rule, rather than create it.134 A good example is 
whether homegrown medical marijuana will affect the larger mari-
juana market—a dispositive question of fact in Gonzales v. Raich 
and critical to applying the Court’s doctrine interpreting the Com-
merce Clause.135
Both sorts of potentially dispositive facts have been the subject 
of in-house fact gathering at the Court in recent years. District of 
Columbia v. Heller—the 2008 decision invalidating a Washington, 
D.C. handgun ban as unconstitutional—provides a good example.136 
In his opinion for the majority interpreting the Second Amend-
ment, Justice Scalia relies on the factual assertion that, at the time 
the Constitution was drafted, “‘[k]eep arms’ was simply a common 
way of referring to possessing arms, for militiamen and everyone 
else.”137 For support, he cites ten historical sources showing com-
mon word usage from the early eighteenth century.138 Three of 
these authorities were brought to the Court’s attention by the 
briefs, but seven of them were found in house. 
Even better examples of potentially dispositive facts found in 
house come from the Court’s cases interpreting the Eighth Amend-
ment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. When asking 
whether lethal injection is cruel and unusual because it creates a 
“substantial risk of pain,” six of the seven opinions in Baze v. Rees 
relied on factual sources not in the record.139
Indeed several of the opinions (including the one for the plural-
ity) discuss an example from Holland—where a similar drug com-
bination is used in legal euthanasia—even though this example was 
not discussed in the briefs and was only brought up in passing at 
134 Id. at 47. 
135 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); see also Faigman, supra note 5, at 47. 
136 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
137 Id. at 2792. 
138 Id. at 2792 n.7. 
139 See, e.g., 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1535 (2008) (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (citing 
Gerritt K. Kimsma, Euthanasia and Euthanizing Drugs in The Netherlands, in Drug 
Use in Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 193, 200, 204 (Margaret P. Battin & Arthur 
G. Lipman eds., 1996), an article on euthanasia practices in the Netherlands); id. at 
1539–40 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing ethics codes from nurses and emergency per-
sonnel); id. at 1543 n.1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Rebecca H. Rhoades, The 
Humane Society of the United States Euthanasia Training Manual 133 (2002)); id. at 
1558–61 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing historical examples of cruel execution meth-
ods). 
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oral argument.140 And a central medical study to answer this ques-
tion about risk of pain—the Lancet study—is drawn into question 
by the Justices who apparently read subsequently released medical 
critiques of it on their own.141 This entire discussion is part of an ev-
identiary procedural free-for-all, which, in fact, prompts Justice 
Alito to warn that public policy on the death penalty should not 
“be dictated by the testimony of an expert or two or by judicial 
findings of fact based on such testimony.”142
Potentially dispositive authorities found in house are not limited 
to constitutional cases. In PGA Tour v. Martin—a case involving 
whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a professional 
golfer’s physical handicap should excuse him from the requirement 
that he walk and carry his golf clubs—the Court found that striking 
the ball and not walking from hole to hole was the “essence” of 
golf, and that the method of transportation on the course evolved 
over time.143 This finding was supported by citations to a book 
called Rules of the Green, and to an encyclopedia of golf issued by 
Golf Magazine—neither of which were in the record or briefs. 
And—as Fred Schauer observed in his review of the case—these 
140 Id. at 1535 (Roberts, C.J.) (plurality opinion) (citing Kimsma, supra note 139); id. 
at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Perspective Roundtable: Physicians and Execu-
tion—Highlights from a Discussion of Lethal Injection, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 448 
(2008)). 
141 Id. at 1564 (Breyer J., concurring) (citing and critiquing the Lancet Study, Leoni-
das G. Koniaris et al., Inadequate Anaesthesia in Lethal Injection for Execution, 365 
The Lancet 1412 (2005)); see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 7–8, Baze, 128 S. 
Ct. 1520 (No. 07-5439) (Breyer, J.) (“What are they? That is, I was—I can’t find—
what should I read? Because I’ve read the studies. I’ve read that Lancet study, which 
seemed to me the only referee for it said it wasn’t any good. And I’ve read the 
Zimmer study and I found in there an amazing sentence to me which says that The 
Netherlands Information Task Force concluded it is not possible to administer so 
much of it that a lethal effect is guaranteed. They’re talking about thiopental. So I’m 
left at sea. I understand your contention. You claim that this is somehow more painful 
than some other method. But which? And what’s the evidence for that? What do I 
read to find it?”). 
142 128 S. Ct. at 1541–42 (Alito, J., concurring). Other in-house factual authorities 
applying Eighth Amendment doctrine can be found in the cases discussing whether a 
“national consensus” has developed to stop imposing a particular punishment on a 
group of people. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (supplementing 
the party’s data as discussed above); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 
(2008) (relying on a website found in house to demonstrate how many executions 
would be permitted if they could be imposed for convictions of child rape). 
143 532 U.S. 661, 683–84 (2001). 
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authorities were used not to answer a question “peripheral or inci-
dental to the Court’s major concern,” but to address the major is-
sue in the case and to determine who won.144
B. Where Do the Sources Come From? 
Apart from the subject matter and purposes for which in-house 
fact finding is used, a final relevant observation is the type of au-
thority the Justices are finding for themselves. Twelve years ago, 
Fred Schauer and Virginia Wise observed that technological ad-
vancements (they chiefly noted accessibility to Westlaw and Lexis 
databases) were changing legal citations in Supreme Court briefs 
and judicial opinions.145 Specifically, they documented an increase 
in citations to what they called “nonlegal” authorities—sources like 
Life magazine, general interest newspapers, and philosophy jour-
nals.146 Many of these sources were being brought to the Court’s at-
tention by the parties and amici. “[B]ut it would be a mistake,” 
they observed, “to attribute too much of the increase to informa-
tion provided in this way by the litigants or amici.”147 Instead, they 
thought there was also an upswing in citation to nonlegal sources 
found independently by the Justices—or perhaps more likely by 
their clerks. 
My research supports that hunch.148 Of the citations I found to 
factual authorities from outside the adversarial process, roughly 
half were discovered in what Schauer and Wise would call tradi-
tional “legal sources.” These authorities include primary and sec-
ondary historical sources,149 law reviews published by American law 
144 Schauer, supra note 15, at 283. 
145 Schauer & Wise, supra note 40, at 495. 
146 Id. at 496. 
147 Id. at 503. 
148 The discussion that follows includes a few choice examples, but all of my research 
notes are available upon request. 
149 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 906 (2010) (citing B. Bailyn, 
Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 5 (1967)) (noting the Framers’ un-
derstanding of robust free speech); Heller, 554 U.S. at 583 & n.7 (citing 3 A Compleat 
Collection of State-Tryals 185 (London, Timothy Goodwin 1719)) (showing common 
usage of the phrase “keep arms” in the early eighteenth century); Troxel v. Granville, 
530 U.S. 57, 96 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing 1 D. Kramer, Legal Rights of 
Children 124, 136 (2d. ed. 1994)) (asserting that through the nineteenth century there 
was no legal right of parental visitation). 
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schools,150 and other resources on subjects related to law (for ex-
ample, police practices).151
The other half of in-house-found facts, however, came from 
sources that are not strictly “legal.”152 On their own, the Justices 
found factual information from journals of social science—
including the American Sociological Review,153 the Journal of Col-
lege Student Development,154 the Journal of Substance Abuse,155 and 
from the National Association of Social Workers.156 They also pur-
sued and cited evidence from medical sources like the Cleveland 
Clinic Journal of Medicine,157 the Journal of the American Medical 
Association,158 the New England Journal of Medicine,159 and the 
Journal on Obstetrics and Gynecology.160
150 Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1991 (2010) (citing statistics in several law re-
view articles for the assertion that joint legal custody has become “increasingly com-
mon”); Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1553 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Cass R. Sunstein & 
Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and 
Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 703, 706 (2005)) (arguing that capital punishment 
has a deterrent effect). 
151 See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2270 n.3 (2010) (citing D. Zu-
lawski & D. Wicklander, Practical Aspects of Interview and Interrogation 55 (2d ed. 
2002)) (stating that modern police training resources instruct officers to obtain a 
waiver or rights before interrogation); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 599 (2006) 
(citing D. Waksman & D. Goodman, The Search and Seizure Handbook (2d ed. 
2006)) (showing an example of sources available to teach officers what is required of 
them under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment). 
152 Of course I acknowledge, like Schauer and Wise do, that the line between the le-
gal and the non-legal is not one that is simple to define. See Schauer & Wise, supra 
note 40, at 497. 
153 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 840 (citing Lincoln Quillian & Mary E. Campbell, 
Beyond Black and White: The Present and Future of Multiracial Friendship Segrega-
tion, 68 Am. Soc. Rev. 540, 541 (2003)). 
154 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003) (Thomas, J.) (citing study for the 
proposition that “black students experience superior cognitive development at his-
torically black colleges”). 
155 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 892 (1992) (citing James A. 
Mercy & Linda E. Saltzman, Fatal Violence Among Spouses in the United States, 
1976–85, 79 Am. J. Pub. Health 595 (1989)). 
156 Id. (citing Benigno E. Aguirre, Why Do They Return? Abused Wives in Shelters, 
30 J. Nat’l Ass’n of Soc. Workers 350, 352 (1985)). 
157 Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 199 (2002) (citing R.S. Car-
neiro, Carpal Tunnel Syndrome: The Cause Dictates the Treatment, 66 Cleveland 
Clinic J. Med. 159, 161–62 (1999)). 
158 Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2857 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Garen J. Wintemute, The 
Future of Firearm Violence Prevention, 282 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 475 (1999)). 
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In addition, the Justices were prone to rely on stories found in 
newspapers or magazines of general circulation. These include na-
tionally circulated periodicals like the Wall Street Journal and the 
New York Times,161 but also stories from the Sacramento Bee,162 the 
Arkansas Gazette,163 and the Tampa Tribune,164 to name a few. The 
Justices also independently found and relied on articles in maga-
zines with more niche audiences, such as Mediaweek, Music Week, 
Sporting News, and Golf Magazine.165
Showing a sign of the times, many of these citations to newspa-
pers were in website format, but reliance on websites was certainly 
not limited to digital periodicals. I found it was quite common for 
Justices to demonstrate the prevalence of a practice through statis-
tics they found themselves. And, at a fairly high rate these statistics 
were supported by citations to websites—I found seventy-two such 
citations in my non-exhaustive search. 
Importantly, statistics were independently gathered from web-
sites with widely ranging indicia of reliability. Some numbers came 
from government agency websites like the Food and Drug Admin-
159 Baze, 128 S. Ct. at 1541 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Perspective Roundtable: 
Physicians and Execution—Highlights from a Discussion on Lethal Injection, 358 
New Eng. J. Med. 448 (2008)). 
160 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 173 n.3 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing 
Eleanor A. Drey et al., Risk Factors Associated with Presenting for Abortion in the 
Second Trimester, 107 Obstetrics & Gynecology 128, 133 (2006)). 
161 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 705, 707 (2010) (citing Jim Carlton, Gay Activ-
ists Boycott Backers of Prop 8, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 2008, at A3 (reporting that oppo-
nents of Proposition 8 compiled Internet blacklists of those supporting the law)); 
Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 734 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Elaine Scio-
lino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faith Out of School, N.Y. Times, Dec. 18, 
2003, at A17 (reporting on France banning religious attire—“invoking interests in 
secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today”)). 
162 Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 26 (2003) (citing a newspaper-conducted study 
on recidivism rates in California). 
163 Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 130 (1998) (citing to show common us-
age of the phrase “to carry”). 
164 Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2290 n.3 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting) 
(citing articles covering car crash to show dangers of high speed chases). 
165  United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1589 (2010) (citing an article in Me-
diaweek about hunting popularity); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster, 545 
U.S. 913, 964–65 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing articles in Music Week and on 
wired.com about the piracy fight); PGA Tour, 532 U.S. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(citing Sporting News); id. at 684 n.40 (Stevens, J.) (citing Golf Magazine’s Encyclo-
pedia of Golf to show competitive nature about the game of golf). 
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istration166 or Customs and Border Patrol.167 Others originated from 
non-profit organizations like the Rape, Abuse & Incest National 
Network,168 the Cato Institute,169 the Center for Reproductive 
Rights,170 or OpenSecrets.org (a site that tracks political campaign 
contributions).171 The implications for these varying sources—a 
chance for imputing bias, a chance for mistake—are discussed be-
low, but suffice it to say the practice of Justices searching online for 
authorities to support factual assertions is not rare in the least. 
Finally, one other form of in-house fact finding bears specific 
mention. In nine different cases, a Justice cites factual information 
solicited from the Supreme Court library.172 These authorities rely 
on data submitted in a letter by an expert who was not recruited by 
either party at any stage of the litigation—and whose “testimony” 
is not submitted under oath. 
Recall that Justice Kennedy in Graham v. Florida relied on such 
letters from various state prison officials to demonstrate how many 
juveniles were serving life sentences across the country.173 Similarly, 
in O’Sullivan v. Boerckel—a case about how federal habeas peti-
tioners must first exhaust their claims to state supreme courts—
Justice Breyer’s dissent cites a memorandum authored by Carol 
Flango at the National Center for State Courts. In her letter—
addressed to the Supreme Court library and on file with the Clerk’s 
office—Ms. Flango provides the Court with statistics on how many 
cases are actually reviewed by state courts with discretion over 
166 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1230 & nn.16–17 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
167 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 128 S. Ct. 831, 845 (2008) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
168 Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2669 n.2 (2008) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
169 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 614 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
170 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625–26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
171 Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 252 (2006). 
172 See Abbot v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 18, 27 (2010); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. 
Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3181 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Gra-
ham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010); Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 
U.S. 365, 374 & n.10 (2006); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 324 n.2 (2004) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 551 (2000) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 863 (1999) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 521 n.8 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing); Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 209 (1987). 
173 130 S. Ct. at 2024. 
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their dockets.174 In none of these instances was the factual informa-
tion briefed by the parties. Instead, a Justice solicited the informa-
tion—almost like a subpoena—from an expert from whom he or 
she wanted to hear and did not reveal the results until the case was 
handed down. 
III. WHY THE CURRENT PROCEDURAL APPROACH IS OUTDATED: 
RISKS OF MODERN IN-HOUSE FACT FINDING 
At this point it should be hard to deny that Supreme Court Jus-
tices routinely look outside of the record for answers to their fac-
tual questions or at least for support to the factual dimensions of 
their arguments. It should also be clear that they do not just con-
duct independent research while mulling over their votes, but they 
also cite what they find as authority for their decisions. The linger-
ing question remains: why does any of this matter? Assuming—as I 
think it is safe to do—that the digital revolution and the dramatic 
change in the way we access information mean in-house fact find-
ing will only increase over time, should it make any difference to 
our normative reactions about the process for this brand of judicial 
decision making? 
My answer—not surprisingly—is yes. The world looks very dif-
ferent from the way it looked when legislative facts were exempted 
from the scope of judicial notice rules in 1975. In 1975, inherent in-
stitutional weaknesses limited the judiciary from pervasively con-
ducting in-house research.175 Crafting the rules to grant courts free-
dom to do extra factual research meant one thing when that 
research took hours or days in the library. Now, however, not only 
are judges still free to look outside the record and the briefs for 
questions of fact, but their ability to do so is tremendously en-
hanced. The digital revolution has two palpable relevant effects: it 
increases the amount of factual information available for review 
174 526 U.S. at 863 (citing Memorandum from Carol R. Flango, Nat’l Ctr. for State 
Courts, to Supreme Court Library (June 11, 1999) (on file with Clerk of Court’s case 
file)). 
175 While academics have engaged in a robust debate about the virtues and vices of 
judicial fact finding compared to legislative fact finding, see, e.g., Devins, supra note 
21, at 1169–70, most agree at the outset of that debate that the judiciary faces signifi-
cant institutional weaknesses in its ability to gather facts, see, e.g., Cheng, supra note 
18, at 1283; Davis, supra note 17, at 4. 
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(statistics, social science research, and polling data can now all be 
posted to the world for free by anyone) and it also makes this in-
formation faster to obtain—literally just fingertips and a Google 
search away.176
This new research tool is a game changer. Of course there are 
benefits to letting judges research freely in a new digital age. Like 
all of us, judges presumably make better decisions when they know 
more. But there are also troubling effects that accompany a robust 
practice of in-house judicial fact finding today. This Article ad-
dresses three of them: the systematic introduction of bias, the pos-
sibility of mistake, and concerns about notice and legitimacy. 
To be sure, these risks have always existed when judges look 
outside the record on questions of fact, but the dangers are more 
potent in a world where information is easily accessed and freely 
traded. As shown above, in-house factual research in the digital 
age is not something that happens on occasion and without conse-
quence. Perhaps in the 1970s the evidence rules could afford to ig-
nore it—but not anymore. 
A. Systematic Introduction of Bias 
Most questions of legislative fact are not easy. Consequently, 
studies and statistics purporting to answer them can be slanted de-
pending on the identity of the researcher or the goal of the re-
search. 
This of course has always been true, and it is true whether the 
question is the subject of expert testimony at trial, briefed by the 
parties on appeal, or researched independently by a judge. But 
when evaluating studies, statistics, or expert opinion purporting to 
answer questions of legislative fact, bias is easier to spot at certain 
stages of litigation than at others. Dueling experts in the courtroom 
can be asked directly about each other’s opinions. The same could 
be said of dueling citations at the briefing process—even when 
facts come from amici—since these sources are all subject to 
counterarguments in reply briefs or at oral argument. 
176 Thornburg, supra note 11, at 167–68 (discussing People v. Mar, 52 P.3d 95 (Cal. 
2002), a California Supreme Court decision in which the majority candidly admitted 
to “us[ing] a Google search to learn about stun belts and their medical effects”). 
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Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker—the 2008 case about punitive 
damages stemming from the Exxon Valdez oil spill—provides an 
excellent example of empirical studies that were presented to the 
Court but financed by a party.177 Justice Souter, writing for the ma-
jority, acknowledged the existence of certain mock jury studies that 
showed punitive damage awards were unpredictable; he went on to 
say, however, that “[b]ecause this research was funded in part by 
Exxon, we decline to rely on it.”178 Interestingly, both the existence 
of these studies and the fact that they were partially financed by 
Exxon were brought to the Court’s attention from within the ad-
versarial process—by various amicus and party submissions.179 The 
safety net of the adversary system, however, is useless when the 
parties do not see the factual sources before the Justices rely upon 
them as authorities and enshrine them in the U.S. Reports. When 
that happens, biased studies—studies conducted by or financed by 
those with a particular point of view—do not get vetted by the liti-
gants first, and the bias can go undetected. 
Sykes v. United States provides another good example.180 There, 
not surprisingly, statistics and studies were marshaled by both par-
ties on the dispositive factual question of whether “[r]isk of vio-
lence is inherent to vehicular flight.”181 Some of these studies made 
it into the Court’s opinion, but they apparently were insufficient to 
answer the question. As discussed above, Justice Kennedy (writing 
for the majority) and Justice Thomas (in concurrence) set forth 
new statistics for how many crashes in Pennsylvania and California 
were caused by police chases. They also cite fatality and injury 
rates from these data, complete with anecdotal evidence reported 
in newspaper articles.182 None of these new data were in the record 
below. 
177 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008). Whether or not these specific studies were sound is a de-
bate I need not enter. 
178 Id. at 2626 n.17. 
179 See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law and Econom-
ics Scholars in Support of Respondents at 14–15, Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (No. 07-219), 
2008 WL 275482 at *14–15; Brief of Plaintiffs, In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (Nos. 97-35191, 97-35192, 97-35193), 1997 WL 34647140 at *39 n.44. 
180 131 S. Ct. 2267 (2011). 
181 Id. at 2274. 
182 Id. at 2279 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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Justice Scalia (in dissent) calls this “untested judicial fact finding 
masquerading as statutory interpretation.”183 He points out that 
“[a]n adversarial process in the trial courts can identify flaws in the 
methodology of the studies that the parties put forward; here, we 
accept the studies’ findings on faith, without examining their meth-
odology at all.”184 Specifically, he notes that the data on which the 
majority relies “may be skewed towards the rare and riskier forms 
of flight”185 because, perhaps, the injuries would have occurred re-
gardless of the police chase. He also complains that “[t]he Court 
does not reveal why it chose one dataset over another,” nor does it 
fess up to the fact that it relies on studies which are “government-
funded.”186
What Justice Scalia is worried about is the unnoticed introduc-
tion of bias that occurs when factual sources are not tested by the 
adversary system. His precise concern is the development of these 
facts late in litigation—in Supreme Court briefs—but his worry is 
even more pointed when the authorities are not seen by the parties 
at all but instead are found in house by judges after the litigants’ 
role is over. 
Importantly, this risk of systematic introduction of bias in fact 
finding is significantly enhanced in the digital age. To “google” 
something is now common parlance and common practice for look-
ing up an unknown fact. But Internet searches like these may not 
present results in a neutral fashion. Since web companies—like 
Google—can gather vast amounts of information about their users 
and because they try to tailor services to our personal tastes, some 
claim the search engines filter the search results depending on the 
searcher.187 A search for “global warming,” for example, may reveal 
different results for different users depending on which websites 
183 Id. at 2286 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
184 Id. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble: What the Internet Is Hiding from You 8–17 (2011) 
[hereinafter Pariser, The Filter Bubble]; see also Eli Pariser, When the Internet 
Thinks It Knows You, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2011, at A23, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/opinion/23pariser.html. 
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are bookmarked, which political blogs are visited, or even what 
groups the users belong to on Facebook.188
The consequence, as Eli Pariser powerfully explains in his new 
book, is that we get trapped in a “filter bubble” and are only ex-
posed to information that confirms our world view.189 These “per-
sonalization filters,” Pariser says, “serve up a kind of invisible 
autopropaganda, indoctrinating us with our own ideas, amplifying 
our desire for things that are familiar and leaving us oblivious to 
the dangers lurking in the dark territory of the unknown.”190 To be 
clear, the fear is not just that we will look for confirmation of our 
own ideas (a possibility that exists with or without the Internet); 
the concern is that Google will silently do this for us. 
Ponder the implications of the filter bubble for in-house judicial 
research of legislative fact. A search for statistics on fatalities in po-
lice chases, or a search for the physiological effect of the chemicals 
used in lethal injection could produce different results for different 
chambers depending on, for example, the Internet history (or Face-
book profile!) of the users. The end result is worse than a Justice 
purposely finding something to cite that supports what she wants to 
argue; it is that she will only find factual authorities to support 
what it is she wants to argue. This opens a real possibility for the 
systemic introduction of bias—unrealized bias—into assertions of 
fact in judicial opinions. 
The American adversary system is designed to combat bias of 
this sort: “Our legal tradition regards the adversarial process as the 
best means of ascertaining truth and minimizing the risk of er-
ror.”191 The idea is that parties compete to persuade a court, keep-
188 Just to be sure I am not inflicting my own scholarship with factual bias, I should 
note that not everyone agrees with Pariser’s thesis. According to an article on 
Slate.com critiquing Pariser’s work, a spokesperson from Google has asserted that 
they actually have “algorithms in place designed specifically to limit personalization 
and promote variety in the results page.” See Jacob Weisberg, Bubble Trouble: Is Web Per-
sonalization Turning Us into Solipsistic Twits?, Slate.com, June 10, 2011, 7:16 AM, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_big_idea/2011/06/bubble_trouble.html. 
In any event, all seem to concur that the technology to produce the filter bubble is out 
there; therefore biased results from tailored Internet searches present at least a poten-
tial risk of in-house fact finding. 
189 Pariser, The Filter Bubble, supra note 187, at 15. 
190 Id. 
191 Frost, supra note 11, at 500 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)); 
see also Neonatology Assocs. v. Comm’r, 293 F.3d 128, 131 (3d Cir. 2002) (opinion of 
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ing each other in check; and “[a]lthough the truth-seeking aspect of 
the adversary system is colored by the desire of litigants to win, 
that competitiveness also helps to control the use of conclusory 
statements as facts.”192 Granted, the system is by no means perfect 
(particularly when the resources of the parties are lopsided). But 
objectivity is lost when shortcuts are taken and a system designed 
to protect against bias is bypassed altogether.193
B. Possibility of Mistake 
A second risk of in-house fact finding is the chance that the 
Court gets the facts wrong. This is more than the possibility of in-
corporating biased factual authorities into judicial opinions. There 
is also the separate concern that the factual authorities found in 
house—and only seen by internal Court personnel before becom-
ing enshrined in the U.S. Reports—will be flatly incorrect. 
Recall Graham v. Florida: the case that invalidated life without 
parole sentences for juveniles who commit non-homicide of-
fenses.194 In that case Justice Kennedy relied on a letter from the 
Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) solicited by the Supreme Court library 
detailing how many prisoners were in fact serving such sentences 
for crimes they committed as juveniles. This letter was kept confi-
dential until the opinion was released. 
then-Judge Alito) (“[T]he fundamental assumption of our adversary system [is] that 
strong (but fair) advocacy on behalf of opposing views promotes sound decision mak-
ing.”); Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 717, 718–19 (2010) 
(noting that “[t]he rationale underlying [the adversary system] is that competition be-
tween opposing parties leads to the triumph of truth,” but arguing that this model as-
sumes “fairly matched adversaries”). But see Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testi-
mony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 Yale L.J. 1535, 1616–25 (1998) (criticizing use 
of competing expert testimony to elucidate scientific facts). 
192 Frost, supra note 11, at 500; Rogovin, supra note 11. 
193 One response to the potential for bias implicit in in-house fact finding is that 
there is always possibility for dissent—an in-house adversary of sorts. We need not 
worry, in other words, about Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas’s use of extra-
record statistics in Sykes because Justice Scalia was there to monitor it and speak up. 
Skeptical eyes are surely one value of dissents generally, but the reassurance is not 
complete. For one thing, there is no guarantee of a dissent in every case (particularly 
in lower courts). And, moreover, when a fact is not dispositive to a case, there is a sig-
nificant risk that dissenting judges or Justices—who, after all, are not in the same po-
sition as rivaling parties—will accept their colleagues’ factual research at face value. 
194 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). 
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One week after the decision, the Solicitor General’s Office sub-
mitted a letter to the Clerk of the Court—subsequently obtained 
by the Legal Times Blog—correcting the numbers listed in the 
BOP report.195 It turns out that not one of the six inmates listed in 
the BOP’s letter was actually serving a life sentence for a crime 
committed as a juvenile.196 The Solicitor General apologetically 
stated that due to “time restraints” the BOP had released auto-
mated inmate records to the Court that were unfortunately inaccu-
rate.197 The Solicitor General’s Office apparently did not know the 
BOP letter to the Court existed until after the decision was re-
leased.198
Granted, we can quibble about whether this mistake had any 
impact on the case’s resolution. Would Justice Kennedy have voted 
differently in Graham had the BOP supplied him with the right 
numbers? Probably not. But even so, as shown above, questions of 
legislative fact can be outcome-determinative and even these po-
tentially dispositive facts are being researched in house. Further, 
and in any event, it seems normatively desirable to want outputs of 
a legal system—even factual assertions that do not change the out-
come of litigation—to be as error-free as possible.199
As is true with the risk of incorporating bias into judicial opin-
ions, the risk of factual mistakes is also one that is exacerbated by 
new modes of digital research. Not only are data easier to find 
thanks to the Internet, but—importantly—they are also easier to 
post. No longer does a budding biologist, political scientist, or stat-
istician need a reputable journal to publish his results. All he needs 
is a reliable Internet connection to post it, tweet it, or link it to his 
195 Debra Cassens Weiss, SG: Bureau of Prisons Supplied Wrong Info to SCOTUS 
in Landmark Juvenile Case, ABA J., May 28, 2010, 8:48 AM, 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/sg_says_bureau_of_prisons_supplied_wrong_
information_to_supreme_court. 
196 See Tony Mauro, Solicitor General Revises Data on Federal Juvenile Sentences, 
Blog of LegalTimes, May 24, 2010, 7:50 PM, http://legaltimes.typepad.com/
blt/2010/05/solicitor-general-revises-data-on-federal-juvenile-sentences.html (quoting 
a May 24, 2010 letter from Acting Solicitor General to Clerk of the Supreme Court). 
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 Frost, supra note 11, at 500 (quoting Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)) 
(“[O]ur legal tradition regards the adversary process as the best means of ascertaining 
truth and minimizing the risk of error.”). 
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Facebook page. In other words, it is now virtually costless to pub-
lish one’s opinions, findings, or research to the world.200
Of course this expansion of information has tremendous value, 
but it also comes with significant risk. As the legal luminary Jon 
Stewart puts it, “the Internet is just a world passing around notes in 
a classroom.”201 Some factual information on the Internet is trust-
worthy, but some of it is not; and discerning the difference is not 
always easy. 
Moreover, with the speed at which information can now be dis-
seminated online it becomes possible for those with a stake in liti-
gation—even if not the litigants—to actually post factual findings 
and studies manufactured in anticipation of the case’s resolution. 
Without knowing it, therefore, a Justice can stumble upon factual 
information online that was purposefully and quickly posted with 
the hope that he would find it. If, at trial, an expert relied on data 
or a study generated with an eye towards the litigation at hand, 
that fact would certainly be brought up by an opponent (and the 
study might be deemed unreliable and screened out under 
Daubert).202 But if the study is instead discovered by a judge in 
house, there is no similar screening mechanism in place to stop it 
from becoming an authority. 
The counterargument, of course, is that mistakes are more likely 
to occur when information is limited. Thus, it could be said, having 
more information available digitally should benefit and not detract 
from the accuracy of judicial decision making. But perhaps the 
wash of factual information judges find themselves able to access 
makes them unrealistically confident in their ability to address sub-
ject matters that are otherwise foreign to them. 
No one should be shocked that judges make decisions about 
things they know little about—that is indeed central to the judicial 
function for courts of general jurisdiction. But also central to the 
200 Yvette Ostolaza & Ricardo Pellafone, Applying Model Rule 4.2 to Web 2.0: The 
Problem of Social Networking Sites, 11 J. High Tech. L. 56, 76 (2010) (“An individual 
can post content on the web for free, making it instantly accessible to anyone who 
wishes to view it; there are no barriers to enter the world of online publishing apart 
from accessing the Internet.”). 
201 Thomas Goetz, Reinventing Television: We Interrupt This Broadcast to Bring 
You a Special Report from Jon Stewart, Wired, Sept. 2005, http://www.wired.com/
wired/archive/13.09/stewart.html. 
202 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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art of judging is the educating function of a trial and (on appeal) 
the briefing process. Indeed, “[t]he process of making a trial re-
cord, so the traditional picture has it, is precisely the process by 
which the judiciary informs itself about matters that would other-
wise have been beyond its ken.”203 Once the judge goes beyond the 
record and briefs to educate himself, are we once again troubled by 
his lack of expertise? 
The answer may depend on the subject matter of the fact. Some 
legislative facts are the sort a Justice is well equipped to evaluate 
on his own and other facts are not. Today’s Justices are all lawyers 
and have experience studying American history, for example, so 
perhaps it matters less that they unearth historical documents on 
their own as opposed to medical journals or raw data. Of course 
this argument is far from infallible. For one thing, not everyone 
agrees that the task of “reliably identifying original intent” falls 
within the competence of judges as opposed to trained historians.204
But even putting historical sources to the side, recall that the 
Justices cite independently found authorities for all sorts of factual 
questions. Very few members of the judiciary have prior experi-
ence in scientific fields, for example.205 And, as most scientists will 
readily admit, all scientific findings are not to be trusted equally.206 
It is not easy to evaluate the significance of scientific claims, not to 
mention the validity of the methods employed.207 Given the limited 
203 Schauer, supra note 15, at 279. 
204 Faigman, supra note 5, at 91 (“Complicating matters substantially is the challenge 
that history as a discipline is rarely able to provide definitive proof and is very suscep-
tible to the biases of the age in which it is done.”). 
205 See Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & Pol’y 19, 
30 (2007–2008) (noting the relative inexperience judges have in math and science). To 
be sure, it is possible that a Justice has a prior background in medicine, physics, or 
psychology, but at the very least her time on the bench would make her out of prac-
tice and perhaps out of touch with the latest research trends. 
206 Faigman, supra note 5, at 32–33. 
207  Brewer, supra note 191, at 1538 (“Most judges and juries, however, are not suffi-
ciently familiar with relevant scientific fields to be able independently and reliably to 
bring scientific information to bear on their decisions.”); David L. Faigman, To Have 
and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Pol-
icy, 38 Emory L.J. 1005, 1081 (1989) (“The legal relevance of social science research 
simply cannot be divorced from its scientific credibility.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Is Pub-
lic Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. Tort L. 1, 32 (2011) (“Courts are severely limited in their 
ability to collect and process large quantities of information about social problems, or 
to evaluate that information when it implicates disputed issues of science or econom-
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time for deciding a case and the limited research resources avail-
able to the judiciary, judges and Justices are institutionally ill-
equipped to evaluate questions of psychology, social science, phys-
ics, or medicine.208 And, consequently, when Justices deal in mat-
ters outside their expertise, they are more likely to make a mistake. 
An example of a possible mistake on this score comes from the 
recent violent video games case, Brown v. Entertainment Mer-
chants Ass’n.209 “Cutting-edge neuroscience,” Justice Breyer wrote, 
“has shown that ‘virtual violence in video game playing results in 
those neural patterns that are considered characteristic for aggres-
sive cognition and behavior.’”210 For this factual proposition he 
quotes a 2006 study published in the Media Psychology journal.211 
At least some neuroscience types, however, now claim that Justice 
Breyer read the study incorrectly—or attributed a conclusion to 
the authors that they did not make.212 The point is that even though 
anyone can sort through neuroscience studies now with just a click 
of a mouse, we should not be confident that judges—or anyone 
without the relevant expertise—can sort through the data on their 
own without making a mistake. 
ics.”); Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Sci-
ence: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. Rev. 91, 94–95 (1993). 
208 But see Cheng, supra note 18, at 1274 (arguing for greater independent research 
on scientific data, and noting that “[a] judge can just as easily search the New England 
Journal of Medicine or some other science-related site as Westlaw or LEXIS”). In ad-
dition, some scholars have called for the judiciary to obtain greater familiarity with 
empirical methods so they are more equipped to handle claims with empirical basis. 
See Faigman, supra note 5, at 181. That argument seems sensible but is distinct from 
the normative question of whether they should be researching such science on their 
own outside the adversarial process. 
209 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011).  
210 Id. at 2768 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting René Weber, Ute Ritterfeld & Klaus 
Mathiak, Does Playing Violent Video Games Induce Aggression? Empirical Evi-
dence of a Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study, 8 Media Psychol. 39, 51 
(2006)). 
211 This study was not the product of in-house research; it was cited in a brief submit-
ted by scientists as amici curiae. See Brief of Social Scientists, Medical Scientists, and 
Media Effects Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Brown, 131 
S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-1448). Nonetheless, it still illustrates the larger point that evalua-
tion of science is difficult for judges, making it all the more significant when they do 
so on their own. 
212 See Neuroskeptic, Violent Brains In The Supreme Court, Neuroskeptic Blogspot, 
July 15, 2011, 9:00 AM, http://neuroskeptic.blogspot.com/2011/07/violent-brains-in-
supreme-court.html. 
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Some may argue that we need not worry about judicial inexperi-
ence with science because it is just this inexperience that will steer 
a Justice toward reputable journals and away from dubious junk 
science.213 But this logic is not completely reassuring. Recall from 
the collection of examples described above that Justices cite au-
thorities with a terrific range of prestige and reputation. Yes, they 
rely on articles in the New England Journal of Medicine, but they 
also cite to blog posts,214 sporting magazines,215 interest group web-
sites,216 and (in lower courts) even to Wikipedia.217
Moreover, Justices—like all of us—have a tendency to engage in 
“motivated reasoning” and to look for facts that support the argu-
ment they are building, wherever those facts may come from and 
despite what other opposing authority is out there.218 This tendency 
may encourage the ad hoc and potentially mistaken evaluation of 
scientific findings—looking for what one wants to see—particularly 
if the studies to be used as authorities were never tested by the ad-
versarial method or addressed by experts below. Couple this reality 
with the new, instant ability to find facts to support almost any-
thing (thanks to Google), and confidence in judicial fact finding 
diminishes significantly. 
With an increased surge of data comes the increased need to fil-
ter out the junk. It is important to recognize that conferring that 
screening responsibility to reviewing judges on their own—without 
assistance from the parties through cross examination or even 
213 Cheng, supra note 18, at 1283. 
214 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 & n.9 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) 
(citing Dave Barth, The Bright Side of Sitting in Traffic: Crowdsourcing Road Con-
gestion Data, Google Official Blog, Aug. 25, 2009, 11:16 AM, 
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2009/08/bright-side-of-sitting-in-traffic.html). 
215 PGA Tour v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 684 n.40 (2001) (Stevens, J.) (citing Golf 
Magazine to show changes in the game of golf); id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (cit-
ing Sporting News to show the competitive nature of the game of golf). 
216 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 625–26 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And let 
us not forget the Court’s abortion jurisprudence, which makes us one of only six coun-
tries that allow abortion on demand until the point of viability.”) (citing Center for 
Reproductive Rights, The World’s Abortion Laws (June 2004), http://www.
reproductiverights.org/pub_fac_abortion.html). 
217 Peoples, supra note 36. 
218 Devins, supra note 21, at 1181–82 (2001); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputa-
tion, and the Inglorious Determinants of Judicial Behavior, 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 615, 
619–24 (2000). 
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competitive briefing—can result in misunderstood information and 
mistakes. 
C. Questions of Fairness and Legitimacy 
Even if Justices are good at independent research in the digital 
age and even if worries about mistakes and bias are overblown, 
there remains a basic question of fairness. This concern has two 
components: (1) the short-term fairness question with respect to 
the parties, and (2) the long-term fairness question about the le-
gitimacy of Supreme Court decisions generally. 
When a Justice relies on factual authorities he finds himself, the 
parties can be taken by surprise. Of course when a question is out-
come determinative to a case, it is not likely that a party will be 
shocked to learn of its relevance at decision time. But parties can 
be surprised when a new fact is brought up to bolster an argument 
or, perhaps more importantly, when a new study or a new statistic 
is used as authority for a question of fact that turns out to be dispo-
sitive. 
An example of the latter can be seen in the violent video game 
case discussed above.219 Several Justices (Breyer, Alito, Thomas, 
and Scalia) conduct their own battle of the experts—drawing on 
sources found both on and off the record—concerning the effect 
these games have on a child’s development.220 Justice Breyer con-
fesses confusion in deciding which expert is right: “I, like most 
judges, lack the social science expertise to say definitively who is 
219 Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729. 
220 In his dissent, Breyer explains the research methodology behind his independent 
research: 
 With the assistance of the Supreme Court Library, I have compiled these two 
appendixes listing peer-reviewed academic journal articles on the topic of psy-
chological harm resulting from playing violent video games. . . .  
 Many, but not all, of these articles were available to the California Legisla-
ture or the parties in briefing this case. I list them because they suggest that 
there is substantial (though controverted) evidence supporting the expert asso-
ciations of public health professionals that have concluded that violent video 
games can cause children psychological harm. . . . And consequently, these stud-
ies help to substantiate the validity of the original judgment of the California 
Legislature, as well as that judgment’s continuing validity. 
Id. at 2771–72 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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right.”221 But of course he picks a side anyway—evaluating some of 
these studies without any input from the parties. 
One consequence of this late-in-the-game introduction of new 
evidence is that the litigants are deprived of their chance to chime 
in. Perhaps, in the respondent’s view, the methodology of the new 
study was biased? Or maybe the relevance of opinion to this spe-
cific issue was questionable? Whatever the reason litigants have to 
complain, when a Justice conducts independent factual research 
and relies on his findings as authority in the opinion, the parties are 
robbed of the chance to protest. Indeed, now effectively “the re-
cord” for legislative facts includes anything a jurist can find on the 
Internet.222 With such a large landscape of information to master, it 
is virtually impossible for a litigant to identify and potentially rebut 
every potentially relevant study. 
This lack of party participation is flatly inconsistent with the 
goals of the adversarial process. Although surely it has its critics, 
the American tradition of litigant autonomy has significant advan-
tages.223 One virtue is that the parties control their own fate: “if a 
party is intimately involved in the adjudicatory process and feels 
that he has been given a fair opportunity to present his case, he is 
likely to accept the results whether favorable or not.”224
221 Id. at 2769. 
222 An example of ambushing an attorney with extra-record facts can be seen at oral 
argument in last term’s Milner v. Department of Navy, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (2011). The 
Court was interpreting a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) provision that ex-
empted the government from making certain disclosures. The question at hand was 
whether the Navy had to disclose some maps it thought should be kept secret for se-
curity purposes. At oral argument, Chief Justice Roberts asked the lawyer for the 
Navy whether a government agency could just classify the information, regardless of 
whether the FOIA exemption applied. The attorney said that he was not “an original 
classifying authority,” and so he “was not in a position to say.” At that point, Justice 
Alito jumped in and supplied an example he found on the Internet: “There is a docu-
ment on the FBI web site called ‘Security clearance process for state and local law en-
forcement,’ which seems to address exactly [this] situation.” See Transcript of Oral 
Argument at *28–29, Milner, 131 S. Ct. 1259 (No. 09-1163), 2010 WL 4876494. 
223 Frost, supra note 11, at 459 (discussing adversarial theory before explaining its 
limitations). 
224 Stephan Landsman, Readings on Adversarial Justice: The American Approach to 
Adjudication 34 (1988). 
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Devotion to the adversary system is thus just as much about fair-
ness to the litigants as it is about producing correct results.225 Al-
though perhaps a judge’s colleagues will keep him honest if he re-
lies too much on new authorities never vetted by the parties,226 this 
does nothing to comfort the litigant who had no notice of the new 
factual source and never had the chance to weigh in when it 
counted. 
Our system is designed so the litigants have meaningfully par-
ticipated in the adjudication of their disputes for another reason: 
this participation also infuses democratic legitimacy into court de-
cisions. In his work on procedural minimalism, C.J. Peters has per-
ceptively pointed out that the political branches do not have a mo-
nopoly on democratic decision making; instead, he argues, 
adjudication involves an element of direct participation and indi-
rect participation too.227 It is narrow-minded, he tells us, “to think 
of adjudication as decisionmaking by judges. Adjudication is deci-
sionmaking by judges and litigants . . . .”228 Litigants frame the ques-
tions, litigants create the arguments, and litigants present the facts. 
This means, in effect, that a court decision carries “a strong meas-
ure of democratic legitimacy”—both as to the parties involved in 
the case and also to future litigants with similar interests whom the 
parties represent.229 “Adjudication may be differently democratic, 
and possibly . . . less democratic, than political decisionmaking. But 
it is inaccurate to say that adjudication is nondemocratic.”230
225 Indeed, at its core, the adversary system evokes elements of due process. Due 
process “focuses on giving the individual an opportunity to present his case, rather 
than on ensuring that a case is accurately and fully argued by some third party.” Frost, 
supra note 11, at 460. 
226 For an example of this, see Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Brown, where he 
first chides Justice Breyer and then Justice Alito for their extra research efforts. 131 
S. Ct. at 2739 n.8 (“Justice Breyer would hold that California has satisfied strict scru-
tiny based upon his own research into the issue of the harmfulness of violent video 
games. . . . The vast preponderance of this research is outside the record—and in any 
event we do not see how it could lead to Justice Breyer’s conclusion, since he admits 
he cannot say whether the studies on his side are right or wrong.”); id. at 2738 (noting 
Justice Alito’s “considerable independent research”). 
227 Peters, supra note 69, at 1481. 
228 Id. 
229 Id. at 1483. 
230 Id. at 1486. 
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Legitimacy concerns matter for more than just the parties to the 
case, or even to similarly situated parties who may be litigating the 
issue in the future. As others have argued, there are good institu-
tional reasons why legislatures and agencies—not courts—are typi-
cally given the responsibility of investigating facts on their own.231 
Putting aside the practical reasons for this division of labor, judi-
cially found factual authorities may be seen as illegitimate in the 
eyes of the public. 
It is important to remember, of course, that the U.S. Supreme 
Court is more than just a court. Its explanatory obligations extend 
further than just to the litigants who bring the case and want their 
dispute resolved. When the Supreme Court relies on facts to issue 
a ruling—particularly a ruling with significant social implications 
for the entire country—it is speaking to the public at large and in 
particular to those people who care about the issue of fact under 
review. 
The question then becomes: when the Justices practice in-house 
fact finding, does it seem unfair in a way that would undermine its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public? Consider a challenge to a stat-
ute that largely turns on a question of legislative fact, like the law 
in California restricting the sale of violent video games to minors. 
Evidence on the effect these games may have on children was 
evaluated or provided by: the California legislators and the interest 
groups who lobbied them; the lower court judges who heard testi-
mony on the subject; the parties who briefed the Supreme Court; 
and the twenty-four interested groups who filed amicus briefs to 
the Court specifically addressing this question.232
This is a wide berth of democratic participation—from the voters 
who enacted the legislation, to the parties who litigated the dis-
pute, to the interested groups who filed briefs with the Court on 
the subject. By going beyond all of those avenues of information to 
look for factual authorities, the Court extracts democratic legiti-
231 See authorities cited supra in note 21. 
232 The list of amici who weighed in on this question include: the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, The Progress & Freedom 
Foundation, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, the Rutherford Institute, Common 
Sense Media, Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund, the California Psycho-
logical Association, the California Psychiatric Association, a collection of social scien-
tists, medical scientists, and media effect scholars, and ten different states. Briefs of 
Amici Curiae, Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (No. 08-2448).  
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macy from its decision—a concern that affects not only parties to 
the dispute, but all of us. 
IV. WHAT SHOULD BE DONE? 
If the current approach of complete freedom to research facts 
outside the adversarial process is broken and outdated, what 
should be done to fix it? I suggest two radically different ap-
proaches that coincide with the two poles on the larger debate 
about judicial minimalism: (1) the minimalist solution is to restrict 
the amount of in-house fact finding—confining the evaluation of 
legislative fact to sources presented by the adversary system; and 
(2) the maximalist solution is to eliminate the problems by opening 
up the adversary system so that information flows more freely and 
openly. Regardless of which course is more persuasive to you, ei-
ther course is superior to the outdated procedural void that cur-
rently exists. 
A. The Minimalist’s Solution: Shut It Down 
The long debate about the proper scope of American judicial re-
view and the propriety of judicial self-control is as old as this coun-
try itself and has been engaged over time by some of the best 
American legal minds.233 Much of the modern debate seems to cen-
ter around Cass Sunstein’s call for “judicial minimalism.”234 In a 
nutshell, new minimalists favor “narrow” and “shallow” judicial 
decisions, as opposed to “wide” and “deep” ones. Making a narrow 
decision means “saying no more than necessary to justify an out-
come, and leaving as much as possible undecided.”235 Making a 
shallow decision means avoiding grand theories and limiting the 
binding impact of the decision to only cases with very similar 
facts.236 The virtues of this path, Sunstein and others have argued, 
233 Peters, supra note 69, at 1455–58 (providing history of the debate featuring the 
work of Alexander Hamilton, Alexander Bickel, James Madison, and Cass Sunstein, 
among others). 
234 Sunstein, supra note 39. 
235 Id. at 3. 
236 Id. Minimalism has both procedural and substantive components. Substantive 
minimalism holds “that the Court should presumptively avoid invalidating the gov-
ernment action challenged in a particular constitutional case . . . .” Peters, supra note 
69, at 1459. Procedural minimalism holds that the Court “should do what is necessary 
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are that it amounts to fewer and less costly errors, while allowing 
space for “democratic processes . . . to maneuver.”237
Minimalism is a more complex concept than the “judicial re-
straint” trumpeted in politics and judicial nomination hearings.238 
Minimalist judges are fine with invalidating legislation under some 
circumstances; they are not committed to majoritarianism any 
more than they are committed to originalism or any other general 
theory or broad rule.239 The hallmark of judicial minimalism is “the 
constructive use of silence” and the willingness to leave things un-
decided.240 This commitment takes several forms: avoiding constitu-
tional questions, respecting precedents, and refusing to issue advi-
sory opinions or decisions in cases which are not ripe, to name a 
few.241
The call for minimalism has been quite influential. Most observ-
ers agree that an increasing number of decisions from the modern 
Supreme Court are minimalist decisions.242 Indeed, some have sug-
gested that Chief Justice Roberts has his eye set on a legacy of 
minimalism.243 And at least seven members of the current Court 
(Justices Roberts, Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan) have been labeled a minimalist—either by Sunstein or 
others.244
to resolve a constitutional case, but should avoid issues not necessary to the resolution 
of that particular case.” Id. 
237 Sunstein, supra note 39, at 53–54. 
238 Id. at x. 
239 Cf. id. at 261 (“A maximalist, for example, may be entirely devoted to the princi-
ple of judicial restraint; consider the idea that all congressional enactments should be 
upheld.”). 
240 Id. at 5. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at xi (“The current Supreme Court embraces minimalism.”); Frederick 
Schauer, Abandoning the Guidance Function: Morse v. Frederick, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
205, 207 (“[W]e have seen an increase in narrow and fact-specific rulings . . . .”). 
243 Jonathan H. Adler, Making Sense of the Supreme Court, The Volokh Conspir-
acy, July 2, 2010, 9:58 AM, http://volokh.com/2010/07/02/making-sense-of-the-
supreme-court (“[A]t present, we can characterize the Roberts Court as a moderately 
conservative minimalist Court (except when its [sic] not).”). 
244 Sunstein, supra note 39, at 9; Frank B. Cross & James F. Spriggs II, The Most Im-
portant (and Best) Supreme Court Opinions and Justices, 60 Emory L.J. 407, 491 
(2010); Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge 
Faith-Based Spending, 32 Cardozo L. Rev. 1009, 1046 (2011); David D. Kirkpatrick, 
Judge’s Mentor: Part Guide, Part Foil, N.Y. Times, June 22, 2009, at A1, A11 (por-
traying then-Judge Sotomayor as a judicial minimalist and quoting former Yale Law 
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A commitment to minimalism, I submit, means seriously restrict-
ing in-house fact finding. Minimalists seek to render decisions that 
are “no broader than necessary” and “incompletely theorized.”245 
When a Justice relies on a factual source he found in-house he is 
necessarily thinking of the future and does not want to be re-
stricted by the authorities presented by the parties. Love it or hate 
it, this is wide and deep decision making; it is not case-specific, and 
not under-theorized. 
In fact, the troubles described above which accompany in-house 
fact finding offer new reasons to favor minimalism. The case for 
minimalism is bolstered if one believes that judicial decision mak-
ing is (1) more likely to lead to mistakes than political decision 
making,246 and (2) is “inherently less legitimate from the perspec-
tive of democracy.”247 As described in Part III above, both concerns 
are exacerbated by the current approach to in-house fact finding. 
A minimalist’s response to in-house fact finding, therefore, 
should be to limit it by revising the Federal Rule of Evidence on 
judicial notice and re-inserting legislative facts into its scope. Prac-
tically speaking, this can take one of several forms. I suggest four. 
The most extreme minimalist reform is to require a reviewing 
court to remand a case back to the trial court to take evidence “the 
old fashioned way” on a factual question that cannot be answered 
by the sources in the record. On this view, the Justices should limit 
their factual authorities to the ones presented by the parties; if the 
Court finds itself unable to answer a factual question within the 
adversarial process, it should stop and send the case back to a tri-
bunal capable of hearing more evidence. For a variety of practical 
Dean and Second Circuit Judge Guido Calabresi, who described Sotomayor’s ap-
proach in a controversial case as one of “judicial minimalism”); Dahlia Lithwick, Her 
Honor, New York Magazine, Nov. 27, 2011, http://nymag.com/news/politics/elena-
kagan-2011-12/index4.html (Justice Kagan “is deciding her cases one at a time, with-
out hints or promises about where she may be moved down the road.”). 
245 Sunstein, supra note 39, at 11. 
246 Neal Devins, The Democracy-Forcing Constitution, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1971, 1978 
(1999) (noting that judicial minimalism is supported by inherent limitations on the 
fact-finding ability of courts because courts are “shackled by the temporal and reac-
tive nature of litigation” and they simply do not have the resources to “engage in 
thorough cost-benefit analysis” of important factual questions). 
247 Peters, supra note 69, at 1460 (noting this justification for minimalism in addition 
to the belief that judges are not better decision makers when it comes to individual 
rights). 
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reasons, this seems less than desirable, but there are other more 
pragmatic reform possibilities. 
Short of a remand, the Rule could instead require additional 
briefing if a factual question remains hazy on the record. If the im-
portance of a legislative fact is highlighted later in the litigation to 
the point that a judge feels the need to gather more information, he 
can simply ask the parties for additional briefing—indeed this is 
sometimes the move when a legal question arises later in the litiga-
tion day. 
Before protesting that requiring additional briefing would be too 
cumbersome and costly, consider the distinct possibility that in-
house fact finding is not always a procedure for gathering knowl-
edge but a procedure for bolstering opinions with data once a deci-
sion is already made. If this is true, then this change would simply 
screen out gratuitous in-house fact finding and leave a mechanism 
in place for instances where the Court is really in the dark on a fac-
tual question. 
Or, even simpler, a third possibility is for the Rule to adopt a 
canon of avoidance—like the canon to avoid constitutional ques-
tions when interpreting statutes—which would mean, in effect, that 
a court should not decide a case in a way that would require extra-
record fact finding. This is similar to the approach advocated by 
Justice Scalia that courts should “not venture into domains in 
which they have little expertise.”248
A final reform possibility (and certainly a more radical one) 
would be a wholesale change to the Supreme Court jurispru-
dence—a shift away from inquiries whose answers depend on legis-
lative facts and towards specific dispute resolution instead. On this 
view, in-house fact finding is just a symptom of a larger problem: 
an emphasis on the wrong kind of information. 
Scholars have recently observed a new empirical emphasis in 
Supreme Court decisions.249 One plausible explanation for this shift 
is that the change in access to information has increased judicial re-
liance on legislative facts, period. Put differently, because legisla-
tive facts are easier to research, they are becoming more relevant. 
Of course, many will applaud this move to empirics and fact-based 
248 Schauer, supra note 15, at 289–90. 
249 See supra text accompanying notes 16, 67. 
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decision making, but to the extent its interaction with digital in-
formation gathering is leading to biased results, mistakes, or le-
gitimacy deficits, perhaps an unregulated Supreme Court empirical 
practice is not worth its cost. 
To the extent, therefore, that the modern Justices want to be 
known as minimalists and a robust practice of in-house fact finding 
is inconsistent with that tenet, it is worth asking whether they are 
taking on too many cases that turn on facts about the world as op-
posed to facts relevant only to the current dispute. 
B. The Maximalist’s Solution: Open It Up 
One can imagine an entirely different approach for reforming in-
house fact finding—one that maps onto the opposite side of the 
debate on judicial roles. Maximalists, as opposed to minimalists, 
are not convinced of the value of leaving things undecided. Judges 
who issue maximalist decisions try to craft broad rules to cover a 
wide range of circumstances beyond just the dispute before them, 
and also to provide “ambitious theoretical justifications” for their 
outcomes.250 The rationale behind this view is that courts should not 
be afraid to engage in “deep” theorizing because there “are occa-
sions where courts ought to speak about right and wrong on highly 
contested divisive social issues.”251 Where minimalists can claim the 
virtue of fewer errors, maximalists can claim the ability to give 
more guidance to lower courts and individuals.252
A related argument from this camp is that the restrictions of liti-
gation can result in poor decisions: that “cases make bad law,” as 
Fred Schauer puts it.253 The idea here is that common law decision 
making—the gold standard for minimalists—rests on “a fundamen-
tally mistaken premise” that superior lawmaking comes from re-
solving actual disputes. The concern is that concrete cases “are 
more often distorting than illuminating,” and that judges focus on 
the “this-ness” of the case at hand while ignoring or misunder-
standing the nature of future similar controversies.254
250 Sunstein, supra note 39, at 9. 
251 Devins, supra note 246, at 1990. 
252 Schauer, supra note 242, at 208 (“Guidance and minimalism are thus opposing 
virtues . . . .”). 
253 Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883 (2006). 
254 Id. at 884. 
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Bearing this in mind, maximalists should find an altogether dif-
ferent problem with the current approach to in-house fact finding. 
The problem is not that judges are looking at too much informa-
tion; the problem is that they are not considering enough. Maxi-
malists distrust the parties to present evidence that comprehen-
sively addresses the factual question because the lens through 
which the parties present it—“I should win my case”—may distort 
the answer for the ordinary case in the future. 
In fact, the nature of a legislative fact is general and forward-
looking; so, on this view, it would be inappropriate to confine one’s 
knowledge of generalized facts to the factual information pre-
sented by the parties—doing so would be unfair to future litigants 
and may distort the accuracy of the answer to the question.255 Fur-
thermore, as Fred Schauer reasons, “[a]lthough it may seem scary 
to have major issues of policy determined by nine relatively unin-
formed people assisted by thirty-odd twenty-somethings surfing the 
Web, similarly dismal characterizations can be applied to the alter-
natives”—that is, fact finding done by Congress.256
From the maximalist perspective, what should be done is to 
make judges better at evaluating legislative facts without the par-
ties’ help. On this view, as Kenneth Culp Davis put it, judges are 
generally “at their best when they are well informed,”257 and there 
is no reason to rely on the litigants to educate them. Thus, the an-
swer to in-house fact finding could lie in structural changes in the 
judiciary meant to educate the decision makers. 
Examples of these reform possibilities include: training of judges 
on empirical analysis (as Judge Posner urges);258 providing an easier 
way for Justices to call on their own experts (as Justice Breyer ad-
vocates and indeed practices);259 and perhaps increasing the re-
sources for the talented Supreme Court librarians and creating a 
judicial research service akin to the Congressional Research Ser-
255 Id. at 905; see also Devins & Meese, supra note 78; Frost, supra note 11, at 516 
(arguing that in some circumstances it is necessary for judges to address issues not 
presented by the parties “when failure to do so would lead to inaccurate or misleading 
statements of law”); Jeffery J. Rachlinski, Bottom-Up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 
73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 933, 933 (2006). 
256 Schauer, supra note 15, at 289. 
257 Davis, supra note 49, at 949. 
258 Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1998). 
259 See Schauer, supra note 15, at 292. 
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vice from which Justices can request help (as Kenneth Davis sug-
gests).260
Others have proposed tweaking the mechanics of the adversary 
system to better educate reviewing judges. Brianne Gorod recently 
suggested increasing and accelerating the role of amici on ques-
tions of legislative fact by loosening the standing requirements at 
the trial court.261 If judges are going to look beyond the record 
anyway it is better, she says, “to bring those organizations and in-
dividuals with relevant facts into the process at the trial court stage, 
when the information they have to offer can be subjected to some 
form of scrutiny and testing.”262
Going one step further, a different reform would be to adopt an 
administrative law model of legislative fact investigation. Instead of 
shutting down in-house fact finding, this proposal would open up 
the process completely. On this view, when the Court contemplates 
a question of legislative fact, it would solicit opinions and evidence 
from all interested parties and encourage public participation, 
much like the notice and comment process in administrative agen-
cies.263 This reform would take advantage of new technologies to al-
low experts, historians, and interested citizens a chance to inform 
the Court about generalized fact questions. 
In fact, the American Bar Association has launched something 
called “The Citizen Amicus Project” which “seeks input from in-
terested parties to help resolve constitutional issues.” The solicita-
tions—aimed at law students—are not “formally filed with the Su-
preme Court, but will be posted in a publically available 
website.”264 Although there of course is no guarantee members of 
the Court would see this website, there is also no procedural hurdle 
preventing them. This is perhaps a first step in harnessing the digi-
260 Davis, supra note 17, at 17. 
261 Gorod, supra note 10, at 69–73. 
262 Id. 
263 At least one scholar has recently noticed that the Court is acting like an adminis-
trative agency with respect to facts relevant to antitrust violations. See Rebecca Haw, 
Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal, 89 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1247 (2011). The implications of this analogy demand far more attention, and I 
hope to pursue them in later work. 
264 American Bar Association, What Is “The Citizen Amicus Project”?, http://www.
americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/citizen_amicus/purpose.html (last visited 
May 16, 2012). 
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tal revolution to increase public participation in the Court’s resolu-
tion of fact-based questions. 
All of the above suggestions for reform are from a maximalist 
perspective—with an eye towards improving judicial competence 
to address questions of legislative fact. If judges are making mis-
takes or relying on biased factual sources, it is because they need 
more help evaluating facts and the institutional reforms have not 
kept up with the changes of the digital age. If judges are undermin-
ing their legitimacy by extracting the democratic participation in-
herent in the adversary method, then they should re-insert it by 
formally asking the public to weigh in with more information. 
CONCLUSION 
The digital revolution has changed so much about the way we 
live and has completely transformed the way we consume facts 
about the world. It is not surprising that court decisions would be 
similarly affected. To date, the review of legislative facts has been 
subject to a procedural hodgepodge—sometimes the subject of ex-
pert testimony, sometimes the subject of briefing by parties or 
amici, sometimes the subject of independent judicial research, 
sometimes all of the above. This assorted procedural reality no 
longer works. As the pace of accessing information accelerates ex-
ponentially—and as judges are understandably tempted to take 
advantage of it—we need to seriously contemplate the implications 
of in-house judicial fact finding and update our approach to ac-
commodate them. 
